(This is part of the Restrictive Covenant Report “Employers’ Toolbox Series,” where we examine lesser-utilized methods of protecting confidential information, trade secrets, and other business interests.)

The Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1836, et seq., is approaching its fifth anniversary after being signed into law by President Barack Obama on May 11, 2016.  To celebrate, we are highlighting some of the issues that have developed in five years of litigating the law’s most notorious feature: ex parte seizure orders.

As we wrote just before the DTSA was signed into law, the ex parte seizure provision has always been controversial.  Under the DTSA, an ex parte seizure order permits immediate confiscation of private devices like desktop computers, laptops, smartphones, or tablets without any advance notice to the device owner, and on the strength of the applicant’s evidence only.  Once granted, the order is served and executed by U.S. Marshalls or other law enforcement officers, similar to a criminal search warrant.

In the five years since the passage of the DTSA, a small but growing body of case law is developing on some important procedural and practical issues arising from ex parte seizure.

  1. Moving to Have the Ex Parte Seizure Application Filed Under Seal

The DTSA contains detailed instructions for obtaining an ex parte seizure order.  Because of the high evidentiary threshold needed for such extraordinary relief, applicants almost always will need to present documentary evidence along with the required affidavit or verified complaint.  Critically, the DTSA does not permit entry of an ex parte seizure order unless the court finds that the applicant “has not publicized the requested seizure.”  18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(VIII).

The DTSA does not define the term “publicized.”  It is unclear whether filing seizure application materials on the public docket could constitute “publicizing” them.  Perhaps in an abundance of caution, many applicants simultaneously move to have the seizure application materials filed under seal.  Several courts have concluded that the applicant “has not publicized” the requested seizure where the application materials were filed under seal.  See, e.g., Shumway v. Wright, No. 4:19-cv-00058-DN-PK, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148882 (D. Utah Aug. 26, 2019); Thoroughbred Ventures, LLC v. Disman, No. 4:18-cv-00318-ALM, ECF No. 6 (E.D. Tex. May 1, 2018).

However, applicants should not treat the motion to seal as a mere formality.  If the applicant fails to meet the legal requirements for filing under seal, that motion could be denied, and in turn could jeopardize the request for emergency relief.  See Corelogic Sols., LLC v. Geospan Corp., No. SACV 20-01500-CJC(KESx), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 246349, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2020) (denying motion to seal an application for a temporary restraining order where the applicant did not make a “document-by-document” showing of “good cause” to merit protection of alleged trade secret information from public disclosure).

  1. Seeking a TRO as a Backup to DTSA Seizure

Understandably, the DTSA sets a very high bar for ex parte seizure—higher, even, than the standard to obtain an ex parte temporary restraining order.  But these are not mutually exclusive remedies.

Even if a court denies the applicant’s motion for ex parte seizure under the DTSA, the court still can grant a motion for a temporary restraining order preventing the defendant from taking potentially harmful actions.  See Cochrane USA, Inc. v. Filiba, No. 18-341 (EGS), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185726, at *9-10 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2018) (denying a motion for ex parte seizure under the DTSA because the applicant failed to establish “extraordinary circumstances” justifying seizure, but granting a motion for temporary restraining order preventing the defendants from “destroying, altering, modifying, forwarding, utilizing, disposing of, or in any other manner changing/altering or dismantling” the applicant’s data).

Temporary restraining orders are still powerful remedies that can be requested in the alternative to or in conjunction with ex parte seizure under the DTSA.  Indeed, even prior to the enactment of the DTSA, temporary restraining orders, including, if warranted, ex parte orders allowing for immediate seizure of electronic media by U.S. Marshalls or other law enforcement officers, were a valuable tool.  Although difficult to obtain and only applicable in limited circumstances, such orders remain an effective substitute for the DTSA’s more rigid seizure protocol.

Unsurprisingly, trade secret litigation has increased since the DTSA’s enactment. New issues relating to the controversial ex parte seizure provision will certainly crop up as more cases are filed. We will continue to monitor developments in this area of the law, and we will update the blog with new insights as they arise.

The District of Columbia appears poised to join the growing number of nearby states regulating and limiting restrictive covenant agreements in the employment context.

Unanimously passed by the D.C. City Council on December 15, 2020 and signed by Mayor Muriel Bowser on January 11, 2021, the “The Ban on Non-Compete Agreements Amendment Act of 2020” goes further than recent laws enacted across the country.  It is a ban on virtually all non-compete agreements.

Specifically, the bill would prohibit employers from requiring or requesting that their employees not: (1) be employed by another person; (2) perform work or provide services for pay for another person; or (3) operate their own business.  Remarkably, the ban would potentially apply during employment, not just after an employee leaves.  How courts would reconcile the ban during employment with common law fiduciary duties and the duty of loyalty remains to be seen.

Now that the Mayor has signed the bill, it will be sent to Congress for review and will become law unless Congress passes a joint resolution disapproving it and the President signs that resolution within a thirty-day period.  The law will become applicable upon approval of a budget and financial plan that includes its fiscal effect. This is expected to take place later this year when the District of Columbia’s 2022 budget and financial plan is approved.

Our Practice Group members explore these issues and others in our article on the potential ramification of the bill and the procedural steps needed for it to become law.  We will continue to monitor the bill’s status and its impact, and we will provide updates on material developments.

In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, Indiana has enacted a new law governing non-compete agreements used with physicians.

Our Practice Group members in Indianapolis authored an article detailing the new law’s requirements.  As the article notes, the new law raises multiple unanswered questions.

And, while not as sweeping as other statutes, Indiana now joins the parade of states enacting new laws limiting the use of non-compete agreements.  We will continue to monitor all state law developments.

It’s not often that a case in our practice area reaches the Supreme Court of the United States, so we are genuinely excited!

In Van Buren v. United States, No. 19-783, the U.S. Supreme Court will have a chance to resolve (finally) the circuit split regarding the scope of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.  Some circuits (the 2nd, 4th and 9th) take a narrow view of the CFAA, allowing claims against employees who lacked any authorization to access information stored on computers, but not allowing claims against employees who were permitted access and misused that access for allegedly improper purposes.  Other circuits (the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 11th) permit CFAA claims against employees for misusing information stored on the computer even though they otherwise were authorized to access such material.  We have posted about this circuit split previously.

Jackson Lewis’s Non-Competes and Protection Against Unfair Competition practice group, in conjunction our Privacy, Data and Cybersecurity practice group, published an article explaining the Van Buren case and its potential impact.

We currently have a nation of employees working remotely.  Regardless of the ultimate outcome at the Supreme Court, employers should consider reviewing and clarifying now their policies concerning which employees have access to what data.  We will monitor the Van Buren case and provide updates.



Is anyone focusing on anything other than the COVID-19 Pandemic?  Apparently, the Virginia legislature and governor are undeterred, enacting a series of new laws.  Among them, Virginia has banned non-compete agreements for lower wage earners, becoming the most recent state to do so.  A summary of the key provisions is included in this article written by our Virginia colleagues Matt Nieman and Jason Ross: https://www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/virginia-enacts-wage-theft-non-compete-laws-amidst-flurry-new-employee-protections 


Texas courts are increasingly encountering efforts to challenge restrictive covenant agreements on free speech grounds, where the restricted activity includes business-related communications. A recent Texas appellate court decision indicates that this strategy has its limits.

In Hieber v. Percheron Holdings, LLC, No. 14-19-00505-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 14, 2019), Percheron Holdings, LLC (“Percheron”) sued Hieber, a former sales executive, for violation of a non-compete and non-solicitation agreement, based on Hieber’s employment with a Percheron competitor and alleged communications with Percheron’s clients during industry meetings and social functions. Hieber responded by moving to dismiss the lawsuit pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act (“TCPA” or the “Act”).

The TCPA does not strictly prohibit lawsuits arising out of a defendant’s free speech activities, but rather it imposes a heightened pleading standard in such cases. The purpose of the Act “is to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.”

Under the TCPA, a defendant may move for dismissal of a legal action that arises out of “a party’s exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association,” if the plaintiff has not pleaded specific facts to support each element of the asserted causes of action. In response to such motion, the plaintiff must articulate the requisite factual basis, or else demonstrate that such basis already has been pleaded. Effectively, the TCPA elevates the required pleading standard for such actions from notice pleading to fact pleading. A plaintiff’s failure to meet the elevated pleading standard in response to such a motion carries the severe consequence of dismissal with prejudice.

Further, the TCPA sets forth a commercial-speech exemption, which provides that the Act “does not apply to a legal action brought against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, if the statement or conduct arises out of the sale or lease of goods, services, or an insurance product, insurance services, or a commercial transaction in which the intended audience is an actual or potential buyer or customer.”

Hieber argued in his motion to dismiss that the activities Percheron characterized as solicitation of customers constituted the exercise of free speech under the TCPA. However, in defeating the motion, Percheron convinced the court that the speech at issue fell within the commercial-speech exemption. Specifically, Percheron established that Hieber was engaged in communications with actual or potential customers of LJA for the purpose of persuading them to engage his new employer as their service provider.

In his attempts to rebut Percheron’s argument, Hieber argued that he “did not sell anything” but was merely an employee of the seller. The court rejected that argument on the grounds that the commercial-speech exemption applies just as much to employees as to a business itself, and because the exemption does not require the defendant to be responsible for a completed transaction. The court explained, “even a proposed transaction will suffice.” The court also rejected Hieber’s argument that the conduct at issue, including his attendance at industry/charity events, did not implicate any efforts by him to sell services to LJA’s actual or potential customers. As the court noted, the entire purpose of those activities was to acquire additional business for LJA.

A review of published case law in Texas reveals approximately twenty cases in the past two years where a former employee moved to dismiss a non-compete or similar restrictive covenant lawsuit under the TCPA. While Percheron successfully invoked the TCPA’s commercial-speech exemption to sustain its claim arising from Hieber’s alleged solicitation of former customers, this exemption only covers customer communications, and may not relate to the majority of potential restrictive covenant violations (e.g., association with a competitor, disclosure of proprietary information to a competitor, solicitation of employees, etc.). As such, employers pursuing restrictive covenant litigation in Texas should first confer with experienced counsel as to whether the TCPA applies to their claims, and, if so, whether there is sufficient information about the alleged violations to establish the Act’s heightened pleading requirements. Employers are encouraged to contact a Jackson Lewis attorney for assistance in this process.

Over the past few years, legislators and government agencies at both the state and federal levels have pushed reforms limiting the use of non-competes and other restrictive covenants by U.S. businesses. Some of those efforts have extended to covenants that restrict a party’s ability to solicit and/or hire employees who are not party to the agreements in question.

In the midst of these headwinds, a new decision from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Automile Holdings, LLC v. McGovern, SJC-12740 (Mass. Jan. 14, 2020), stands out for its approval of an anti-raiding provision. Our article discussing the McGovern decision can be found here.

On November 14, 2019, the U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship held a hearing to examine recently proposed bills that would regulate non-compete agreements at the federal level. Discussion during the hearing indicates that it may have the necessary support to move forward.

Pending Non-Compete Legislation

On October 15, 2019, Senators Chris Murphy (D-CT) and Todd Young (R-IN) introduced the 2019 Workforce Mobility Act, which would ban all non-compete agreements across the country, with limited exceptions involving the sale of a business or the dissolution of or disassociation from a partnership (see A Renewed Attempt in Congress to Eliminate Non-Compete Agreements, dated November 18, 2019). The Act would also require employers to notify employees of the law’s requirements, and would establish a comprehensive enforcement scheme empowering the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Labor, and aggrieved employees to seek redress for violations of the law.

The Workforce Mobility Act constitutes a far more extreme approach to non-compete reform than Senator Marco Rubio’s Federal Freedom to Compete Act, which was introduced on January 15, 2019 and would only permit the use of non-competes with respect to FLSA-exempt executive, administrative, professional, or outside sales employees. While those FLSA exemptions are not completely predictive of an employee’s work experience or wage rate, the stated objective of Senator Rubio’s legislation was to protect “entry-level, low-wage workers[.]”

The Hearing on Non-compete Agreements and American Workers

Last week, the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship reviewed the 2019 non-compete bills at a hearing entitled “Noncompete Agreements and American Workers.” Testifying at the hearing were:

  • Evan Starr — Assistant Professor of Management and Organization, University of Maryland School of Business;
  • John Lettieri — President and Chief Executive Officer of Economic Innovation Group; and
  • Keith Bollinger – A North Carolina resident who testified about the negative consequences that a non-compete agreement allegedly posed in his effort to pursue gainful employment.

Professor Starr’s research figured prominently in the Obama Administration’s State Call to Action, which urged state governments to impose strict limitations on the use of non-compete agreements. More recently, Professor Starr authored a brief entitled, “The Use, Abuse, and Enforceability of Non-Compete and No-Poach Agreements,” which further advocated in favor of non-compete reform. That brief was published by Economic Innovation Group — Mr. Lettieri’s organization. Notably, the hearing did not include testimony from any non-compete proponents.

The testimony of Professor Starr and Mr. Lettieri was largely supportive of the 2019 Workforce Mobility Act, which would ban non-competes completely in the traditional employment context. Both expressed the view that employers could protect their legitimate business interests through less restrictive measures, including client non-solicitation covenants, agreements barring the use or disclosure of trade secrets, and the enforcement of federal and state trade secret laws. Professor Starr and Mr. Lettieri also advocated for further measures to protect workers, including:

  • Requirements obligating employers to educate their employees of the applicable (i.e., state-specific) non-compete laws;
  • Requirements obligating employers to give advanced notice of any obligation to sign a non-compete agreement;
  • The imposition of strict penalties on employers who imposed unlawful or overly burdensome non-compete agreements on employees; and
  • Requirements that employers continue paying employees for the duration of any post-employment non-compete restrictions.

Senators who spoke during the hearing included: Marco Rubio (R-FL), Todd Young (R-IN), John Kennedy (R-LA), Mitt Romney (R-UT), Josh Hawley (R-MO), Ben Cardin (D-MD), Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Mazie Hirono (D-HI). Of them, Senators Young, Hawley, and Cardin offered the strongest endorsements of the 2019 Workforce Mobility Act. Senator Rubio also appeared to accept the policy justifications behind a complete ban, although he closed the hearing by seeking to build a consensus around his own proposal to prohibit non-competes for “low-wage employees.” Of the remaining participants, Senators Romney and Kennedy were the only legislators to express opposition to federal non-compete reform.

What Next?

The November 14 hearing offered a brief preview of Congressional attitudes towards federal non-compete reform. The coming months will offer further clarification as to whether, and to what extent, legislation has the prospect of becoming law. We will continue to update readers on any developments. Employers with questions about the lawfulness of their restrictive covenant agreements are encouraged to contact a Jackson Lewis attorney.

On August 26, 2019, the Delaware Chancery Court invalidated a California employee’s customer and employee non-solicitation covenant on the grounds that it violated California law. In doing so, the Court rejected the plaintiff company’s attempt to override California law by including a Delaware choice of law provision in the underlying agreement.


We initially reported on the case of NuVasive v. Miles, Case No. 2017-0720-SG, on December 10, 2018, after the Chancery Court denied the defendant employee’s original motion for partial summary judgment. NuVasive, a Delaware corporation with headquarters in California, hired Miles as an executive-level employee in California. Upon his hiring, Miles entered into an employment agreement with Nuvasive containing a non-competition covenant as well as both customer and employee non-solicitation covenants. The agreement also included Delaware choice of law and choice of forum provisions.

When Miles resigned and joined a competitor, NuVasive sued in Delaware to enforce the non-competition and non-solicitation covenants. In response, Miles alleged that the restrictive covenants, as well as the choice of law and choice of forum provisions, were unenforceable under California law.

Court Initially Upholds Delaware Choice of Law Provision

In its order dated September 28, 2018, covered in our original article, the Chancery Court examined the validity of the agreement’s Delaware choice of law provision, asking:

      • Would another state’s laws apply in the absence of a choice of law provision?
      • If so, would enforcing the non-compete covenant violate a fundamental public policy of that other state?
      • If so, are the other state’s applicable public policy interests materially greater than the applicable public policy interests of Delaware?

Because Miles resided, worked, and sought to compete in California, the Chancery Court determined that the restrictive covenants would normally be subject to California law in the absence of a choice of law provision. The court further held that enforcement of the non-compete covenant under Delaware law would violate California’s fundamental public policy interests in light of: (1) Section 16600 of the California Business and Professional Code, which strictly prohibits all restraints on competition in the employment context; and (2) Section 925 of the California Labor Code, which prohibits choice of law or choice of forum provisions that circumvent California’s statutory protections or restrict access to a California judicial forum. The court declined at the time to render a judgment about the customer and employee non-solicitation covenant, due to the lack of clarity about whether such covenants also were prohibited under Cal. Bus. & Prof’l Code Section 16600.

As for the third question, the Chancery Court held in the initial order that California’s public policy interests against the enforcement of non-compete covenants did not outweigh Delaware’s own public policy interests favoring freedom of contract. The court based its conclusion on the assumption that Miles negotiated the employment with the assistance of counsel. Although California Labor Code Section 925 generally prohibits parties from contracting around California substantive laws and California judicial forums, it carves out an exception with respect to employees who are represented by their own legal counsel during the contract negotiations. By that carve-out, the court reasoned, the California Legislature recognized “that in the limited subset of cases where the inequality of bargaining strength of the parties to an employment contract is buffered by the employee being represented by independent counsel, and where counsel participated in negotiation of the terms of a choice of law provision, California’s interest in freedom of contract outweighs interest in freedom of employment.”

Court Reverses Course and Rejects Restrictive Covenants under California Law

Notwithstanding the court’s September 28, 2018 order, Miles subsequently submitted sufficient evidence to persuade the court that he had not, in fact, been represented by counsel during the negotiation of the employment agreement. With these facts, on June 7, 2019, the court reversed its earlier decision and held that the non-compete covenant was subject to and invalid under California law.

Although the court invalidated only the non-compete covenant in its June 7, 2019 order, it requested further briefing from the parties as to whether the non-solicitation covenant also was contrary to California public policy. In the August 26, 2019 order, the court answered that question in the affirmative.

In reaching this conclusion, the Chancery Court noted that California courts have classified customer and employee non-solicitation covenants as “restraints” on competition, even if they fall short of prohibiting competition entirely. The Chancery Court pointed to the California Supreme Court decision in Edwards v. Arthur Anderson LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 292 (Cal. 2008), which held that a restriction on one’s ability to perform work for certain clients constitutes an invalid restraint on competition under Cal. Bus. & Prof’l Code Section 16600. More recent decisions have applied similar reasoning to invalidate employee non-solicitation covenants, although the case law regarding employee restrictions is less settled.

The Chancery Court’s decision hinged on its refusal to honor the parties’ contractual choice of law, based on California Labor Code §925. Oddly, however, Miles signed his employment agreement containing the Delaware choice of law and forum provisions in 2016, before the effective date of California Labor Code §925. It is unclear whether such an argument might have impacted the Chancery Court’s decision.


In summary, the Chancery Court held that Miles’ non-compete and non-solicitation covenant were both void under California law, and, therefore, enforcement of the covenants would be contrary to California public policy. Moreover, NuVasive could not invoke the employment agreement’s Delaware choice of law and choice of forum provisions to circumvent California’s ban on such covenants because Miles had not retained an attorney to assist in the negotiation of the agreement. As such, the court dismissed NuVasive’s breach of contract claims.

As this case highlights, employers should be careful when attempting to enter into restrictive covenant agreements with California employees, and should always do so with the assistance of an experienced non-compete attorney. This case also shows that it can be to the employer’s interest to ensure that the other party has legal representation, in certain circumstances.

Companies needing assistance in the drafting of restrictive covenants are encouraged to contact a Jackson Lewis attorney for further guidance.

In numerous states throughout the country, legislatures are moving to limit the use and enforcement of non-compete and other restrictive covenant agreements. Two such states, Maryland and Virginia, are seeking to curtail such agreements with regard to low-wage employees.

Virginia Senate Bill 1387

On January 17, 2019, the Virginia Senate introduced SB 1387, which would prohibit employers from “enter[ing] into, enforc[ing], or threaten[ing] to enforce a covenant not to compete with any low-wage employee.” A “low-wage employee” is defined as one who earns less than the average weekly wage of the Commonwealth,[1] and includes interns, students, apprentices, and trainees, whether or not they are being paid for their work, as well as some independent contractors.[2]

Senate Bill 1387 also would prohibit covenants not to compete that “restrict an employee from providing a service to a customer or client [whom] the employee does not initiate contact with or solicit[.]” A covenant not to compete is broadly defined as an agreement “between an employer and employee that restrains, prohibits, or otherwise restricts an individual’s ability, following the termination of the individual’s employment, to compete with the former employer.”

In addition to banning non-competes for low-wage employees, the bill would establish a private right of action for low-wage employees against any former employer (or other person) who attempts to enforce a prohibited agreement. An affected employee must commence the action within two years of the latter of: (1) the date the agreement was signed, (2) the date the low-wage employee learned of the agreement, (3) the date the employment relationship was terminated, or (4) the date the employer attempted to enforce the agreement. In addition to authorizing awards of injunctive relief, compensatory damages, liquidated damages and costs and attorney fees, Senate Bill 1387 would require courts to assess a civil penalty against culpable employers in the amount of $10,000 for each violation.

Additionally, all employers would be required to post a copy of the Bill (or an approved summary) ”in the same location where other employee notices required by state or federal law are posted.” Violations of this requirement would subject employers to penalties of escalating severity (written warning for first violation; civil penalty of up to $250 for second violation; and civil penalties of up to $1,000 for each subsequent violation).

On February 12, 2019, the Senate Committee on Commerce and Labor designated SB 1387 as “passed by indefinitely.” As of the current date, it is unclear whether the Committee will give it further consideration.

Maryland Senate Bill 328

On January 30, 2019, the Maryland Senate initiated a similar effort when it introduced SB 328. Less than four months later, after passing the Senate and House, the bill took effect without the Governor’s signature.

At first glance, MD 328 appears far more restrictive than VA SB 1387, as it declares all “noncompete [provisions] that restrict[] the ability of an employee to enter into employment with a new employer or to become self-employed in the same or similar business or trade” as “null and void as being against the public policy of the State.” However, the introductory section makes clear that the non-compete ban only applies “to an employment contract or a similar document or agreement concerning an employee who earns equal or less than […]$15.00 per hour; or […] $31,200 annually[.]” Although the Bill does not clarify whether it applies to restrictive covenants that fall short of prohibiting competition, such as customer non-solicitation covenants, it expressly excepts from its coverage any “employment contract[s] or similar document[s] or agreement[s] with respect to the taking or use of a client list or other proprietary client-related information.”

In contrast to VA SB 1387, which stalled out in committee, MD SB 328 passed both the House and Senate on April 5, 2019. Pursuant to Maryland’s Constitution, Governor Larry Hogan was required to sign or veto the bill by May 25, 2019, or else do nothing and allow it to become law automatically. Ultimately, Governor Hogan chose the latter option, and the Bill automatically became law, subject to an effective date of October 1, 2019.

In summary, while the Virginia Legislature has not acted to advance SB 1387, Maryland has enacted its own ban on non-competes for low-wage employees. We will continue to follow the Virginia bill and will update readers on any developments. Employers needing assistance in complying with the non-compete laws of the states in which they operate are encouraged to contact a Jackson Lewis attorney for further guidance.

[1] The average weekly wage is determined by the Virginia Employment Commission (the “Commission”) by adding the total wages (excluding wages of U.S. government employees) reported on contribution reports to the Commission for the 12-month period ending the preceding June 30 and divided by the average monthly number of insured workers and then divided by 52. In March 2018, for example, the average weekly wage in Virginia was $1,152.

[2] Low-wage employees include independent contractors who are paid at an hourly rate that is less than the median hourly wage for the Commonwealth of Virginia for all occupations as reported, for the preceding year, by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor. In May 2017, for example, the median hourly wage for the Commonwealth of Virginia for all occupations was $19.13.