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CIRCUIT COURT
MULTNOMAH COUNTY

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
FOR THE COUNTY OF MULTNOMAH

NIKE, INC., an Oregon corporation,
Plaintiff,

v.

DENIS DEKOVIC, an individual; MARC
DOLCE, an individual; and MARK
MINER, an individual,
Defendants.

No. 14CV18876

COMPLAINT

- 1) Breach of Contract
- 2) Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
- 3) Breach of Duty of Loyalty
- 4) Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
- 5) Tortious Interference with Current and Prospective Contractual and Economic Relations
- 6) Fraud in the Inducement
- 7) Conversion/Replevin
- 8) Civil Conspiracy

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

NOT SUBJECT TO MANDATORY
ARBITRATION

ORS 21.160: \$10,000,000

Plaintiff Nike, Inc. ("Nike") by and through its undersigned counsel brings this action against Denis Dekovic ("Dekovic"), Marc Dolce ("Dolce"), and Mark Miner ("Miner") (collectively, "Defendants"), and alleges as follows:

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I. INTRODUCTION

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2 1. While still Nike employees, three now former Nike footwear designers,
3 Defendants Dekovic, Dolce, and Miner, conspired to and developed for themselves, and then
4 for Adidas, a strategic blueprint for a creative design studio to compete against Nike, began
5 consulting with Adidas, misappropriated Nike trade secrets for use in their new business
6 venture and attempted to destroy evidence of their scheme. They then boasted online about
7 their new affiliation with Adidas to generate support for and lure other designers to join their
8 enterprise. Nike will suffer irreparable harm if this scheme is permitted to continue and
9 Nike’s competitively valuable information is left in the hands of Defendants who have
10 expressed their desire to financially gain from exploiting the stolen trade secrets, including
11 by promoting their knowledge of Nike’s trade secrets as a means of enticing Adidas to
12 employ them. Nike thus requests that this Court enjoin Defendants from, among other
13 things, using the misappropriated materials and order Defendants to immediately return those
14 materials to Nike.

15 2. Defendants’ plot sprung to life in April of 2014, when they began a campaign
16 to promote their independent design studio venture by, among other things, buying thousands
17 of phony social media followers to help create the false perception of buzz and popularity
18 surrounding their design careers. These social media and other networking efforts succeeded
19 in attracting Adidas, which is reportedly facing “enormous pressure” to turn around its
20 struggling athletic footwear and apparel businesses in the wake of drastic declines in profit
21 and market share. The conspirators pitched the concept of a supposedly innovative
22 independent design studio to Adidas, which Defendants sweetened with promises to “bring a
23 wealth of information and knowledge that will give Adi[*das*] the advantage” that Defendants
24 knew Adidas could use to “hurt [*its*] competitor” Nike, including what Nike had strategically
25 “planned for the next 2-3 years” in its “3 biggest business[*es*]”—running, sportswear, and
26 football (soccer). The result was that Adidas effectively purchased Defendants’ studio

1 concept outright, so that the concept would belong to Adidas if the parties were to do
2 business. This included a condition that Defendants become full time Adidas employees, not
3 just consultants. But because formal employment agreements would be an obvious, blatant
4 and overt breach of Defendants' agreements with Nike, Defendants became Adidas
5 consultants in exchange for the promise of future employment. Although they had sacrificed
6 a measure of independence, Defendants had ensured funding for their design studio concept,
7 which they intend to use as vehicle for competing with Nike.

8 3. While still employed by Nike and at Adidas' request, Defendants began (in
9 their own words) "do[ing] work for" Adidas as consultants to develop the blueprint for the
10 design studio concept, including its strategic "vision," how it would be structured, how it
11 would operate, where it would be located, its operating budget and staffing, how it would
12 interact with the Adidas brand, and the "main objectives of the role[s]" in the organization
13 for each designer, all in direct and flagrant violation of their noncompete agreements with
14 Nike, which prevent each Defendant from "consulting for, or being connected in any manner
15 with . . . Adidas" during their employment with Nike and for one year thereafter. In reality,
16 the blueprint was largely a knockoff of one of Nike's own product design approaches, the
17 Kitchen, Nike's Innovation lab, complete with identical or similar language and concepts.
18 Adidas later inked employment contracts with all three designers, redubbing their new
19 enterprise the "Brooklyn Creative Design Studio." Defendants shared with one another that
20 they "d[id]n't really want to work for adi[das], but [had agreed to since] their money can
21 allow us to shortly own our own business." Defendants viewed their time at Adidas as
22 merely "a step towards" creating a truly independent design studio, and all agreed that "[a]s
23 soon as we are ready we can terminate the agreement with Adidas and begin the studio."

24 4. Fearing that their work for Adidas while still employed at Nike was unlawful
25 and in clear breach of their noncompete agreements with Nike, Defendants decided that they
26 needed to get Adidas "to confirm and get in writing that Adidas will offer [them] legal

1 support” and “cover [the] lawyer fees With Nike” if ever Nike discovered their disloyalty and
2 deception. Defendants showed a copy of their Nike noncompete agreements to Adidas,
3 which in turn promised Defendants that it would handle the situation by “paying [the] cost to
4 help [them] leave”, including “pay an outside law firm to help manage the situation” and
5 represent them in an ensuing lawsuit. Adidas even arranged meetings with outside counsel
6 hired by Adidas to reassure the conspirators. After one such meeting, Dekovic shared his
7 perception with Dolce and Miner that the outside lawyers Adidas had hired “wanted to make
8 some drawn out case [so their] firm [could] win a case against Nike.”

9 5. With reassurances of legal support and lucrative job offers from Adidas in
10 hand, Defendants made certain they would be able to fully deliver on their promises to
11 Adidas to provide it with a competitive advantage. They did so by stealing a treasure trove
12 of Nike product designs, research information, and business plans for use in Adidas’ new
13 design studio. Dekovic told Dolce and Miner that he would “get all the files [from his
14 laptop]” and then “send [it] back” to Nike. And that is exactly what he did. Days before
15 leaving Nike, Dekovic told Nike his laptop had stopped working, took that broken laptop to
16 an independent contractor, and had the contents of his Nike-issued laptop copied, including
17 thousands of proprietary documents relating to Nike’s global football (soccer) footwear
18 product lines. He then returned the broken laptop to Nike without uttering a word about the
19 copy he had made. In addition, just three days before leaving Nike, Dolce sent an email to
20 his personal email account with highly confidential design drawings related to an as-yet
21 unreleased shoe designed for one of Nike’s sponsored athletes. The material stolen by
22 Defendants (the “Confidential Information”) includes:

23 a. **Nike’s Future Strategic Development Plans, Product Offerings, and**
24 **Product Launches.** Extremely confidential and commercially sensitive
25 master strategic business plans that reflect Nike’s global football business
26 strategies for the next three-to-four years, including specific strategies for

1 competing directly against Adidas through 2016, many of Nike’s key planned
2 global football product launches (including footwear, uniforms and
3 equipment), and where and how Nike has chosen to focus its resources;

4 **b. Nike’s Unreleased Product Design Materials.** Drawings, models,
5 renderings, sketches, material designs, and design schematics for Nike global
6 football footwear and apparel and other athletic footwear products set to be
7 released over the next two-to-three years, including models of team uniforms
8 (kits) for the 2016 European Championships, and other footwear, uniforms,
9 and accessories, reflecting details of each product’s design, including
10 materials, fabrics, cuts, and color strategies;

11 **c. Nike’s Unreleased Product Technology.** Documents reflecting proprietary
12 and highly confidential innovations in Nike’s athletic apparel and footwear
13 technology that have yet to be made public, including computer assisted
14 design (CAD) drawings, and technical packs for as yet-unreleased global
15 football footwear, material, and equipment innovations.

16 **d. Nike’s Financial Product Performance Information.** Documents reflecting
17 a non-public financial breakdown of footwear sales at the product level,
18 including past performance data, gross margin expectations, and projected
19 growth for the next 12 to 18 months;

20 **e. Nike’s Marketing Campaign Materials.** Documents containing complete
21 descriptions of Nike’s footwear product marketing strategies, including
22 promotion, in-store presentations, training, and public relations relating to
23 specific past and future product launches and events, including story lines
24 around new product launches, and plans for Nike-sponsored athletes and
25 teams such the French, English, Dutch, Korean, United States and Brazilian
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1 national teams, as well as top club teams FC Barcelona, Manchester City,
2 Paris St. Germain, Inter Milan and AS Roma;

3 f. **Nike's Virtual Testing Methodologies.** Documents describing Nike's highly
4 confidential and proprietary virtual footwear product design and computer
5 simulation testing methodology and other product development and testing
6 plans; and

7 g. **Nike's Blueprints for Product Launches.** Documents reflecting all aspects
8 of specific Nike product launches, amounting to a veritable step-by-step
9 instruction manual for conducting a successful product launch.

10 All of this information is among the most important and highly confidential information in
11 Nike's athletic footwear businesses, particularly its global football footwear business.
12 Disclosure of any of this information would irreparably harm Nike, by, among other things,
13 enabling a competitor to effectively undermine and counter Nike's performance in the
14 athletic markets for the next three to four years, particular in the global football category.

15 6. Well aware that "[a]ll [of their] work computers, [and] work cell phones"
16 would be full of months' worth of incriminating "information that [Nike] can acquire,"
17 Defendants then executed the final step in their scheme: they attempted to conceal their
18 misdeeds by erasing the incriminating emails and text messages on their Nike-issued iPhones
19 and laptops. Dekovic's laptop and iPhone had already been physically damaged (and the
20 contents recovered and copied by Dekovic unbeknownst to Nike), but Dolce and Miner reset
21 their iPhones in an attempt to make their text messages and emails inaccessible to Nike.
22 Dolce also deleted most of his laptop computer files, including emails reflecting Defendants'
23 scheme, and documents and data belonging to Nike. And Miner also erased incriminating
24 emails and data from his laptop.

25 7. Defendants then resigned and turned in devices that they believed to be clear
26 of evidence of their betrayals. On their final day at Nike, they took to social media to declare

1 their new allegiance to Adidas and to promote the Adidas brand in further violation of their
2 noncompete agreements with Nike. Defendants plastered their social media accounts with
3 messages for their followers, expressing that they were “excited” to become part of the “three
4 stripes” (a well-known Adidas trademark) and “Team Adidas 2015”, all in the hopes of
5 luring “other talented designers ... to follow” them to Adidas. While they publicly heralded
6 Adidas’ brand, Defendants were privately telling Nike of their love and respect for Nike’s
7 brand, and even how they hoped to return to work as consultants for Nike in a few years’
8 time.

9 8. Dekovic, meanwhile, had all the while been working on another side footwear
10 and sportswear business that he had kept hidden from Nike and, apparently, from his co-
11 conspirators and Adidas. Dekovic had developed a “Moonwalker” line of footwear and
12 sportswear while working at Nike based on, in part, existing vintage Nike designs, which he
13 plans to commercialize in violation of his agreement to assign to Nike the rights to any
14 product designs conceived while he was employed at Nike. With the help of outside
15 investors, whom he begged to keep the business “confidential” and told that he “could be in
16 hot waters for doing this,” Dekovic is poised to launch the Moonwalker shoes and sportswear
17 line in early 2015.

18 9. Nike’s Confidential Information remains in the clutches of individuals who
19 induced Adidas to hire them by promising to deliver a “wealth” of Nike’s information to
20 “give Adi[das] the advantage,” and who are certain to exploit the trade secret information in
21 conjunction with the Adidas-backed Brooklyn Creative Design Studio. There is no doubt
22 that Defendants have already used and intend to further wrongfully use Nike’s Confidential
23 Information for their own benefit, and intend to allow Adidas to further use it for its own
24 competitive advantage to Nike’s detriment. Defendants have further stated their plans to
25 continue consulting with Adidas prior to the expiration of their one-year noncompete period,
26 including travel to Adidas’ headquarters to meet with Adidas’ design employees in the

1 coming months and continuing to advise Adidas regarding the structure and operation of the
2 Brooklyn Creative Design Studio. They have already even begun trying to contact Nike-
3 sponsored athletes.

4 10. Nike faces irreparable harm in the form of lost market share of its global
5 football and athletic footwear markets, lost sales, and lost goodwill if Defendants are not
6 enjoined from this continued and ongoing wrongdoing, including from consulting for or
7 launching a creative design studio with Adidas, connecting themselves to Adidas through
8 social and traditional media, continued use of Nike's Confidential Information still in their
9 possession in operating the design studio or otherwise, and launching the Moonwalker
10 business.

11 11. Nike is entitled to temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief to
12 remedy Defendants' ongoing unlawful conduct. As a result, Defendants should be:

- 13 a. temporarily, preliminarily, and permanently enjoined from using or benefiting,
14 directly or indirectly, from the use of Nike's Confidential Information;
- 15 b. ordered to immediately return all copies of Nike's Confidential Information in
16 their possession, custody, or control;
- 17 c. ordered to produce their personal devices and account passwords for forensic
18 examination, at Nike's expense, by an independent forensic examiner;
- 19 d. ordered to immediately destroy and to certify under oath the destruction of all
20 materials derived in any way, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, from
21 Nike's Confidential Information, including the strategic blueprint for their
22 Brooklyn Creative Design Studio and any related materials;
- 23 e. ordered to impose a constructive trust on, and provide a detailed accounting of,
24 all revenues derived from the use of Nike's Confidential Information;

- 1 f. enjoined for a reasonable period of time from publicly associating or
2 connecting themselves with Adidas, including via the internet, social media,
3 or traditional press;
4 g. enjoined for a reasonable period of time from pursuing any other footwear
5 design opportunities whether independently or in conjunction with Adidas or
6 any other Nike competitor;
7 h. enjoined from negotiating with any investors, selling any products, or
8 otherwise launching any business venture relating to the Moonwalker shoe
9 and sportswear designs;
10 i. ordered to disgorge all unjust enrichment as a result of their taking and use of
11 Nike's Confidential Information; and
12 j. ordered, jointly and severally, to pay Nike compensatory and punitive
13 damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

14 II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

15 12. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court because the claims arise out of conduct that
16 occurred while Defendants were employed by Nike in Oregon. In addition, Defendants are
17 each parties to noncompete, nondisclosure, and invention assignment and secrecy agreements
18 with Nike in which each Defendant irrevocably and unconditionally consented to jurisdiction
19 in this Court.

20 13. Venue is proper in Multnomah County because one or more of the Defendants
21 currently resides in Multnomah County, and a portion of the Defendants' wrongdoing alleged
22 herein occurred in Multnomah County.

23 III. PARTIES

24 14. Plaintiff Nike is an Oregon corporation with its principal place of business in
25 Beaverton, Oregon.

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1 15. Dekovic is a Croatian citizen believed to be residing in Italy. He was
2 employed by Nike in Beaverton, Oregon from November 2005 until September 22, 2014.

3 16. Dolce is a United States citizen residing in Oregon. He was employed by
4 Nike from October 2005 until September 22, 2014.

5 17. Miner is a United States citizen residing in Oregon. He was employed by
6 Nike from March 2008 until September 22, 2014.

7 **IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

8 **Nike and Adidas' Competitive Positions in the Sports Footwear and Apparel Markets**

9 18. Nike is the world's leading manufacturer, designer, and distributor of athletic
10 footwear, apparel, equipment, and accessories. Nike's sports footwear and apparel brand is
11 number one in the world, realizing sales of over \$25 billion in 2013. Nike has nearly 57,000
12 employees worldwide, including 8,000 at its World Headquarters in Beaverton, Oregon.

13 19. Nike and Adidas are key competitors in the global athletic apparel and
14 footwear industries. In recent years, it has been reported that Adidas has lost market share to
15 Nike and other competitors, including in the global market for football and other athletic
16 footwear, and particularly in the North American market. Adidas' decline has accelerated in
17 recent months. One news article recounts how Adidas "stunned investors" earlier this year
18 after a "litany of troubles led Adidas to slash its net profit" forecasts. The media has also
19 widely reported that Adidas "believes it faces enormous pressure" to turn around its business.
20 Adidas CEO Herbert Hainer recently admitted that "we know we have to raise our game."

21 20. In contrast, Nike has substantially increased its share of the global athletic
22 footwear marketplace over the past decade, rising to its place as today's world number one.
23 Nike's success in the global athletic apparel and footwear markets reflects Nike's investment
24 of tremendous time and resources into its business. Across all product categories, including
25 global football, basketball, American football, and running footwear and apparel, Nike
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1 expends considerable time and resources designing, researching, developing, testing,
2 producing, and marketing its products.

3 **Nike's Development and Protection of Its Footwear Brands**

4 21. Nike takes substantial measures to protect and ensure the secrecy of its
5 competitively valuable and trade secret information, including, in particular, designs and
6 plans for future releases of Nike products. Nike design employees are required to sign
7 noncompete contracts obligating them to protect Nike's trade secret information. Nike
8 further restricts physical and electronic access to its confidential research, plans, documents,
9 and schematics concerning footwear and apparel designs to the limited set of employees who
10 require access to that information to perform their specific job duties.

11 22. While Nike has always heavily invested in efforts to protect its proprietary
12 and trade secret information, since 2012 Nike has invested more than \$1.5 million dollars and
13 a substantial amount of senior management time and attention in a company-wide security
14 initiative known as "Keep It Tight" or "KIT"—a program designed to educate employees
15 regarding the protection of Nike's proprietary and confidential information, including its
16 product design information. The KIT initiative provides employees with on-line training on
17 social media, information security, device (laptop/mobile) security, and workplace and
18 situational awareness security. There has been, and continues to be, significant publicity of
19 the KIT principles on postings throughout the Nike campus and on Nike's internal employee
20 website and social media platforms. KIT serves as a reminder to all Nike employees of the
21 great lengths to which Nike goes to prevent leaks of proprietary, confidential, and trade
22 secret information and reinforces the company-wide culture of locking down such
23 information.

24 23. Dekovic, Dolce, and Miner have been intimately involved for years in the
25 design and planned future development of Nike's global football, running, sportswear, and
26 basketball footwear and other product lines. Dekovic began working as a Senior Designer

1 for Nike in 2005, and worked his way up first to Design Director for Nike's Global Football
2 category in 2012, and then Senior Design Director in 2014. Dekovic was responsible for
3 managing Nike's Global Football Footwear Design function, including creating and
4 executing forward looking strategies for the football category, with a focus on footwear. As
5 the most senior member of the Global Football footwear design team, Dekovic worked
6 closely with Nike's executive leadership to plan and produce product innovations, seasonal
7 footwear lines, and special products for high profile athletes and events such as the World
8 Cup and Olympics. In addition to his strategic and leadership responsibilities, Dekovic had
9 direct oversight and final approval over a team of footwear designers who designed and
10 developed footwear products, primarily "boots" (cleated footwear) used by football leagues
11 and teams worldwide, involving Nike's proprietary technologies and product details (color,
12 detail, fit, performance, materials, graphics and trims). Several of the footwear models on
13 which his team was working at the time of his resignation included proprietary and
14 confidential Nike designs, innovative materials, and methods of manufacturing footwear.

15 24. Dolce began at Nike in October 2005 as a Senior Designer in Nike's Active
16 Life Division. After his promotion to Design Director of Nike Sportswear in 2007, Dolce
17 was responsible for setting the creative direction for and managing a team of Nike designers
18 who designed seasonal lifestyle sports footwear for basketball, American football (NFL), and
19 cross-training, including developing a lifestyle line of basketball shoes for current NBA stars
20 like LeBron James, Kobe Bryant, and Kevin Durant, and up and coming stars such as Kyrie
21 Irving. In this role, Dolce also became responsible for managing some of the largest
22 sportswear franchises in Nike history, including Air Force One, The Blazer and The Dunk.
23 In 2011, Dolce also became the Design Collections Lead for Nike Sportswear where he
24 created updated versions some of Nike's best known vintage NFL, basketball, and other
25 sportswear shoe designs, which are set for launch over the next several years. Dolce was also
26

1 the lead product designer for another as-yet unreleased line of signature shoes for one of
2 Nike's star sponsored-athletes.

3 25. Miner joined Nike in March 2008 as a footwear designer in Nike's Global
4 Women's Training category. In 2011, he was promoted to Senior Footwear Designer of Nike
5 Running. Miner was primarily responsible for designing and developing footwear for Nike's
6 running and training lines, specializing in conceptualizing and designing performance
7 running footwear. Miner was creatively involved in several extremely popular and iconic
8 Nike product lines, such as NIKE Free, AirMax, and Zoom Air, including products in those
9 lines that have yet to be commercially released.

10 26. By virtue of their positions at Nike, each Defendant was privy to the details of
11 Nike's global footwear business, including specific planned future product design and
12 development information and forward-looking strategic plans for the growth of Nike's
13 footwear product lines worldwide. Defendants also had access to Nike's confidential and
14 competitively valuable footwear marketing plans and performance materials, including sales
15 and performance of Nike products relative to Adidas products. And Defendants had access
16 to documents extensively summarizing Nike's research and testing on innovative new
17 materials and designs – including information about structural design, product materials, and
18 marketing strategies – that will not be made public for several years. The materials to which
19 Defendants had access included copies of unlaunched product kits for Nike's football
20 products, such as for Nike-sponsored teams competing in the UEFA European Football
21 Championship in 2016, and in the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

22 27. Due to their knowledge of and access to Nike's competitively valuable and
23 trade secret footwear information, Defendants agreed to take several measures to protect that
24 information, including: (1) not to compete with Nike during and for a period of one year
25 following their employment; (2) not to use or disclose any of Nike's confidential information
26 and to return all copies of such information upon leaving Nike's employment; (3) not to

1 solicit other Nike employees away from Nike to a competitor; and (4) to assign to Nike the
2 rights to any inventions conceived during their employment.

3 28. Each of the Defendants signed a Covenant Not to Compete and Non-
4 Disclosure Agreement (“Noncompete Agreement”), true and correct copies of which are
5 attached hereto as Exhibits 1, 2, and 3. The Noncompete Agreements explicitly prohibit each
6 Defendant from “consulting for, or being connected in any manner with” any Nike
7 competitors, including Adidas, during the term of their employment with Nike and for a
8 period of one year thereafter. Specifically, each Defendant agreed that:¹

9 **During EMPLOYEE’S employment by NIKE, under the terms of**
10 **any employment contract or otherwise, and for 1 year thereafter, (the**
11 **“Restriction Period”), EMPLOYEE will not directly or indirectly,**
12 **own, manage, control, or participate in the ownership, management or**
13 **control of, or be employed by, consult for, or be connected in any**
14 **manner with, any business engaged anywhere in the world in the**
15 **athletic footwear, athletic apparel or sports equipment and**
16 **accessories business, or any other business which directly competes**
17 **with NIKE or any of its parent, subsidiaries, or affiliated corporations**
18 **(a “Competitor”)....includ[ing], but ... not limited to: Adidas.**

15 29. The Noncompete Agreements further explicitly require Defendants not to
16 disclose Nike’s sensitive, confidential, proprietary, and trade secret information to Nike’s
17 competitors or any other-third party, and to return all copies of such information to Nike at
18 the time their employment ended. Specifically, each Defendant agreed that:

19 **During the period of employment by NIKE and for a period of two**
20 **(2) years thereafter, EMPLOYEE will hold in confidence and**
21 **protect all Protected Information and will not, at any time,**
22 **directly or indirectly, use any Protected Information for any**
23 **purpose outside the scope of EMPLOYEE’S employment with**
24 **NIKE or disclose any Protected Information to any third person or**
25 **organization without the prior written consent of NIKE. Specifically,**
26 **but not by way of limitation, EMPLOYEE WILL NOT EVER copy,**
transmit, reproduce, summarize, quote, publish or make any
commercial or other use whatsoever of any Protected Information
without the prior written consent of NIKE. EMPLOYEE will also take

¹ Although the Complaint quotes Dolce’s Noncompete Agreement specifically, the language in each of Defendants’ Noncompete Agreements is substantially similar in all material aspects relevant to this lawsuit and true and correct copies of each agreement are attached hereto.

1 reasonable security precautions and such other actions as may be
2 necessary to insure that there is no use or disclosure, intentional or
inadvertent, of Protected Information in violation of this Agreement.

3 The Agreements broadly define "Protected Information" as "any and all information
4 to which EMPLOYEE has access concerning NIKE projects and internal NIKE information"
5 regardless of the form, including any "trade secrets and competitively sensitive business or
6 professional information (regardless of whether such information constitutes a trade secret)"
7 relating to Nike's product development activities, including the Confidential Information
8 described above.

9 30. The Noncompete Agreements also prohibit Defendants from soliciting one
10 another, or any other Nike employee, to leave Nike to serve as an independent consultant or
11 employee of Adidas or any other competitor. Specifically, each Defendant agreed that:

12 **During the term of this Agreement and for a period of one (1) year**
13 **thereafter, EMPLOYEE will not** directly or indirectly, **solicit**, divert
or hire away (or attempt to solicit, divert or hire away) to or for
14 himself or any other company or business organization, **any NIKE**
employee, whether or not such employee is a full-time employee or
15 temporary employee and whether or not such employment is pursuant
to a written agreement or is at will or any independent contractor
16 working for Nike.

17 31. Each of the Defendants also signed an Employee Invention and Secrecy
18 Agreement, true and correct copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibits 4, 5, and 6.
19 Under the terms of the Invention and Secrecy Agreements, each Defendant "assign[ed] to
20 Nike all...inventions...conceived" during his employment term with Nike relating "in any
21 way" to Nike's "business...or products." Defendants further agreed to "disclose promptly
22 and in writing to Nike all [such] inventions ... conceived or made by me during the term of
23 my employment with Nike whether or not such inventions are assignable under this
24 Agreement."

25

26

1 32. These confidentiality and noncompete provisions, to which Defendants
2 agreed, are essential to Nike maintaining its leading and competitive position in the global
3 athletic footwear industry.

4 **Defendants Set In Motion Their Plot to Turn on Nike**

5 33. Defendants flouted their contractual obligations and fiduciary duties of loyalty
6 to Nike, when—while still Nike employees—they developed for themselves, and then for
7 Adidas, a strategic blueprint for a creative design footwear and sportswear studio to compete
8 against Nike, misappropriated critical Nike trade secrets for use in their new business
9 venture, attempted to destroy evidence of their scheme, began consulting with Adidas, and
10 then boasted online about their new affiliation with Adidas to generate support for and lure
11 others to join their creative design studio.

12 34. In April of 2014, Defendants began conspiring to leave Nike to pursue their
13 plan of starting an independent creative design studio that would compete against Nike in the
14 athletic footwear and sportswear markets. On April 29, 2014, Dekovic advised Miner and
15 Dolce to use his personal email address for further communications. Thereafter, the three
16 designers conspired amongst themselves using their personal email accounts and personal
17 cell phones in an effort to avoid detection by Nike.²

18 35. It did not take long for Defendants to decide that the easiest way to get the job
19 done would be to simply set up their own copycat version of Nike’s innovating design lab,
20 known as the Kitchen, by using the knowledge and information of Nike’s design processes
21 that they possessed by virtue of their positions and experience at Nike. The three were
22 determined to turn their design studio into a reality at any cost, which they referred to at
23 different times in their scheme by various code names such as “H-Design,” the “Satellite,”

24 ² However, Defendants accessed from and/or copied these communications to their Nike laptops,
25 thereby granting Nike access to their communications pursuant to Nike’s Electronic Communications Policy,
26 which states in relevant part: “NIKE reserves the right to access the electronic communication systems and
monitor data and messages within them, and to read, reject or remove any message, including attachments,
composed, sent or received, at any time for any reason.”

1 and the “Design Center of Excellence.” And, at one point they even tellingly proposed
2 calling the venture the “Innovation kitchen” or “Zoo”—references to the names of Nike’s
3 design labs.

4 36. The challenges, however, that Defendants faced in attempting to launch their
5 knock-off design studio without the backing of a major athletic apparel player were funding
6 the operation, establishing credibility, and securing a sufficient client base to make the
7 business sustainable. Rather than launching the studio fully on their own, Defendants
8 decided to manipulate their social media accounts to artificially boost their stature in the
9 athletic footwear industry in the hopes of attracting an investment partner to help back and
10 finance their venture.

11 37. On May 18, 2014, Dekovic and Dolce agreed on a plan to pay for Instagram
12 and Twitter followers to artificially inflate perceptions of their popularity and manufacture
13 credibility among their social media followers and major sportswear companies including
14 Adidas. Defendants proceeded to do just that: an analysis of Defendants’ public Instagram
15 and Twitter pages using third-party software that can detect purchased followers shows that
16 more than 85% of Defendants’ followers were purchased.

17 38. At the same time that he was plotting with Dolce and Miner to form a
18 company to compete with Nike, Dekovic was all the while deceiving Nike into believing that
19 he loved Nike, its brands, and that his long term career plan was to remain with Nike.
20 Dekovic made it clear to other managers in the Nike design group with whom he worked that
21 he had a strong desire to stay with Nike. Dolce and Miner similarly represented to other
22 Nike employees that they planned to remain with Nike for the long term.

23 39. When an issue with Dekovic’s visa status arose in late May 2014, Dekovic
24 duped Nike into paying more than \$50,000 to relocate him and his family to Italy in June on
25 the false basis that he planned to continue his career at Nike for the foreseeable long term
26 future. In reality, Dekovic knew all along that he was going to leave Nike within the year,

1 one way or another. In fact, he gloated to his co-conspirators within a month of his move
2 that “Italy is one of those” countries among the set of “countries where [Nike’s] non compete
3 is difficult to enforce.”

4 **Defendants Target Adidas as the Vehicle for Accomplishing Their Unlawful Scheme**

5 40. At the same time that Defendants had hatched a plot to start their own version
6 of Nike’s design innovation lab, Adidas began actively attempting to recruit them to become
7 designers for Adidas. After suffering steep global declines in its business, Adidas sought to
8 expand and refocus its athletic footwear brands, and to compete more directly and effectively
9 with Nike in those spaces. One principal step Adidas saw in reversing its decline was hiring
10 top talented designers to improve its core product offerings.

11 41. Time was of the essence for Adidas. As widely reported in the press, Adidas
12 had “slashed” its profit forecasts by over 30% (more than €300 million), reported a 6%
13 overall decrease in quarterly revenue, and a 20% decrease in North American sales, and
14 faced “enormous pressure” to turn around its business in the near term to satisfy uneasy
15 investors. Herbert Hainer, Chief Executive Officer of Adidas, admitted to company
16 shareholders and market analysts that “we know we have to raise our game.”

17 42. Adidas’ need to recruit talented designers and develop innovative new designs
18 to drive product sales would prove to be perfect timing for Defendants, who were struggling
19 to find a partner to make their consultancy vision a reality. Defendants saw an “opportunity”
20 when Adidas came calling and they did not hesitate to “cash in” on it. Defendants discussed
21 amongst themselves Adidas’ profits and “market share declining sharply,” agreeing that they
22 did not “see adi[das] turni[n]g things around” in the future “without a big change.”

23 43. Fueled by their desire to get “rich” and “cash in” on the Adidas opportunity,
24 Defendants ultimately concluded that “what must be done is to join the two things”—the
25 vision of an independent design studio and the funding and backing Adidas would provide—
26 to create a viable business that could compete against Nike. Defendants thus decided that

1 they would pitch their design studio concept to Adidas as that “big change”—an innovative
2 “new” way of product design that would “give Adi[das] the advantage” in the footwear and
3 sportswear markets. In exchange, Adidas would fund and back Defendants’ design studio
4 concept, providing the client base, credibility, and resources necessary to make the venture a
5 commercial success.

6 44. Defendants were determined to stick together as a “team” of business partners
7 in their planned new venture and agreed not to go to Adidas unless and until they all could
8 make the move together. Dekovic promised Dolce: “I won’t go to adi[das] without you.”
9 And they sold themselves to Adidas “as a team and not as individuals,” agreeing with one
10 another that “We are not presenting ourselves as 3 designers but as the best team in the
11 world.” At one point, they even discussed that “if Nike doesn’t enforce [its] non compete on
12 all of us” that one or two of them could start “earlier than [the] rest” and then the three would
13 “split our non compete money with those person [sic] that don’t get it.” For better or for
14 worse, Defendants were all in it together. And they remained in constant communication
15 with one another, exchanging tens of thousands of messages regarding their plans in the
16 months preceding their departure from Nike.

17 45. Defendants thus packaged their design studio concept and proceeded to pitch
18 it to Adidas. Those discussions began in March 2014, when former Nike executive Brian
19 Foresta, now Vice President, Design Global Basketball at Adidas, first reached out to Dolce
20 and Dekovic with an invitation to get together to “discuss professional careers” sometime in
21 the next few months. By June 2014, Defendants were fully engaged with Tauna Dean, a
22 recruiter at Adidas and Eric Liedtke, a member of Adidas’s executive board, in discussions
23 relating to their design studio concept. Dekovic even personally presented their vision to
24 Adidas CEO Herbert Hainer in June, which, according to Dekovic, “really impressed him.”

25 46. Defendants’ purportedly novel and innovative approach to product design was
26 simply a trumped up knockoff of Nike’s collaborative design approach. Of course, that had

1 been their plan all long—to simply start their own design studio by copying Nike’s proven
2 success. Defendants’ strategic outlines, plans, documents, and emails describing their design
3 studio concept are replete with identical or similar language and concepts to those used in
4 Nike’s business, and in fact, the entire “collaborative” design paradigm and approach the
5 Defendants planned to use in operating their venture is remarkably similar to one of Nike’s
6 design approaches, the Kitchen (Nike’s innovation lab).

7 47. As Defendants would later discuss amongst themselves, none of the
8 conspirators “really want[ed] to work for adi[das], but their money can allow us to shortly
9 own our own business.” They thus settled on a plan where they would work for Adidas for a
10 few years, pool the money earned doing that, and then leave Adidas to start a truly
11 independent design collective that would compete with both Adidas and Nike. In the end,
12 Defendants decided Adidas was merely “a step towards” creating a truly independent version
13 their design studio concept “in the sense that it allows us to escape from Nike and begin to
14 network, prepare the field [and]. . . . As soon as we are ready we can terminate the agreement
15 with Adidas and begin the [independent] studio.”

16 **Defendants Begin Consulting with Adidas While Still Employed by Nike**

17 48. Adidas and the three conspirators hit it off immediately. Both sides could see
18 the potential for future success and Defendants sold their design studio concept as just one of
19 many “great possibilities” between them and Adidas. In fact, Adidas was so enthralled with
20 the Nike design ideas that Defendants had artfully repackaged as their own, it effectively
21 bought their studio concept outright, insisting that the concept belong to Adidas the parties
22 were to do business. Defendants thus became Adidas consultants, in exchange for the
23 promise of future employment, and their independent venture was eventually re-branded as
24 the Adidas-backed “Brooklyn Creative Design Studio.”

25 49. Despite the unambiguous contractual restrictions on associating or consulting
26 with Adidas or any other competitor during and for a one year period following their Nike

1 employment, Defendants began (in their *own* words) “work[ing] for” Adidas as consultants
2 in early June 2014 regarding how to organize, set up, and operate the Brooklyn Creative
3 Design Studio. For example, on June 29, 2014, Dekovic met with Adidas’ then Design
4 Director (and current Vice President) Brian Foresta to discuss the structure of what
5 Defendants’ team would be and how it would operate. Following this discussion, Defendants
6 agreed to create for Adidas a “blueprint” setting out the details of the Brooklyn Creative
7 Design Studio. As Defendants later discussed amongst themselves, they would try to sell the
8 concept of the venture to Adidas, but convince Adidas to let them operate the studio as an
9 independent entity, which “will allow us to start working immediately after resigning with
10 Nike.”

11 50. At or around the same time in June 2014, however, Defendants became
12 concerned about the legal consequences of their consultation work for Adidas in light of,
13 among other things, Defendants’ noncompete and confidentiality agreements with Nike.
14 They determined that they needed to get “Adidas [to] cover [the] lawyer fees With Nike,”
15 ultimately concluding that “We need to confirm and get in writing that Adidas will offer us
16 legal support.”

17 51. Defendants decided that they would send Adidas a copy of their noncompete
18 agreements to review, and seek confirmation that Adidas was willing to hire lawyers to
19 protect them. Miner asked the other two whether he should “ask Abby [Ornstein, Senior
20 Director of Human Resources for Nike’s Global Design Division] for my non compete?”
21 Not wanting to risk tipping Nike off to their plans, Dolce replied “No way!!!” and Dekovic
22 confirmed that there would be no need; he had a copy of his. On June 21, 2014, Dekovic
23 sent Adidas a copy of his Nike Noncompete Agreement. Defendants then sought express
24 assurances from Adidas that it would help them “manage” the ensuing legal fallout if they
25 continued to consult with Adidas while Nike employees and during the one year period
26 thereafter.

1 52. As Defendants recounted amongst themselves, Adidas promised Defendants
2 that it would handle the situation by “paying [the] cost to help us leave,” including a promise
3 to “pay for an external legal office” to represent the designers in an ensuing lawsuit. Adidas
4 was so eager to sign Defendants that it even hired outside counsel and arranged for meetings
5 between them and the Adidas-provided outside counsel to reassure the conspirators. After
6 one such meeting with the outside lawyers hired by Adidas, Dekovic recounted his
7 perception that the law firm welcomed a lawsuit by Nike against the three conspirators,
8 explaining that he “got the feeling from this guy that he wanted to make some drawn out case
9 to make his firm win a case against Nike.”

10 53. Satisfied that they could count on Adidas to pay the legal costs associated
11 with the fallout of their consultation, over the next several weeks Defendants continued to
12 develop the blueprint for Adidas setting out how the collective design studio would operate.
13 On July 16, while still Nike employees, Defendants shared with Adidas’ representatives the
14 trio’s specific blueprint for the Brooklyn Creative Design Studio. Defendants’ plan included
15 details as to how the new “design collective” organization would be structured, how it would
16 operate, where it would be located, how it would interact with the Adidas brand, and the
17 strategic “vision” for the new collective and “main objectives of the role[s]” that each
18 designer would hold within the collective.

19 54. Over the next few months Defendants continued to develop the studio
20 blueprint design for Adidas, meeting with and communicating those details primarily to
21 Brian Foresta, Eric Liedtke, and Adidas’ Global Creative Director, Paul Gaudio. Their
22 development of the studio eventually became so specific that it laid out the location within
23 New York, the design of the physical space right down to the square footage, and the
24 architectural design firm Defendants wanted to hire to build it. Their progress became so far
25 advanced that they decided to begin “scout[ing] the area [to] see what’s available” on the
26 budget Adidas provided for the space. Defendants also developed with Adidas a “budget for

1 [them] to have surrounding team members ready” and began developing the specific roles
2 and job responsibilities for their employees, which they proposed at one point as two
3 footwear designers, one to two graphic designers, one writer, one brand designer.

4 55. Defendants, however, grew annoyed that they had so far been uncompensated,
5 save for the promise of future employment, for the consulting design work they had
6 performed for Adidas. As they wondered in messages to one another, a day after receiving
7 yet another request for from Adidas’ Tauna Braun and Paul Gaudio to provide comments on
8 their roles, where the studio would be, how it would be used, and other conceptual ideas:
9 “how can you ask someone who you’re not paying to do work for you[?]” Defendants thus
10 pressed Adidas for something more immediate than the promised future employment: formal
11 employment contracts under which they would be paid for the consulting work that they
12 already had performed in creating the blueprint for the Brooklyn Creative Design Studio and
13 for their future employment services.

14 56. On or about August 22, Adidas presented Defendants with lucrative offers of
15 full-time employment. Although Defendants had initially pushed to remain independent
16 consultants with Adidas, in the hopes of retaining the creative influence and control that they
17 might lack as employees of Adidas, eventually Adidas made clear that it would not fund
18 Defendants’ venture unless Defendants ceded a greater measure of control over the business.
19 Defendants grudgingly became Adidas employees, in the end abandoning their once stated
20 desire for independence so that they could simply “cash in” on the sale of the design studio
21 concept to Adidas.

22 57. In fact, in subsequent discussions with Adidas, the three designers were able
23 to negotiate better terms and greater compensation by emphasizing the benefits to Adidas of
24 hiring them and leveraging their status as Nike designers. Dekovic promised Adidas that by
25 hiring all of the Defendants, Adidas would gain “the advantage” of the Nike knowledge and
26 information that Defendants would bring with them. Tellingly, Defendants discussed among

1 themselves, in the context of their Adidas negotiations, leveraging the critical Nike
2 information they possessed, including the product launches and other strategic moves Nike
3 had “planned for the next 2-3 years” in its “3 biggest business[es]”—running, sportswear,
4 and football.

5 58. This is not a case where Defendants simply applied and interviewed for pre-
6 existing roles at Adidas, and discussed basic dates and terms of future employment. Rather,
7 at Adidas’ request and while still employed at Nike, Defendants actively consulted with
8 Adidas to create the very positions that they would hold at Adidas, the very design collective
9 that they would operate and control at Adidas, the very design of the physical space in which
10 they would work, and the very details of the organizational structure, operation, and fit
11 within the Adidas brand. Defendants delivered all of the above in a precise and
12 independently valuable blueprint for starting a collective design studio to compete with Nike
13 – all based on Nike’s proven successful model. Even if Defendants had never gone to work
14 for Adidas, Adidas would still be able to set up the studio to compete with Nike.

15 59. Defendants’ consultation and work for Adidas while they were still Nike
16 employees did not stop with the creation of the Brooklyn Creative Design Studio. In fact,
17 Defendants requested arrangements for Adidas to pay for “2 trips and travel to start building
18 vision and connections” for the studio during the one-year period following their Nike
19 employment. Defendants also continued to attend key product innovation and design
20 meetings, and football, running, and sportswear strategy planning sessions across the globe
21 all the while knowing (unbeknownst to Nike) that they were now working for Adidas and no
22 longer loyal to Nike. Adidas had essentially purchased, by proxy through Defendants, access
23 to the highly confidential and trade secret Nike product information and strategic plans
24 discussed in these meetings and strategy sessions.

25 60. Further demonstrating that Defendants have no intention of waiting out their
26 contractual noncompete periods, over the past few weeks (after leaving Nike) Dekovic has

1 already begun contacting Nike employees in an attempt to secure contact information for key
2 Nike-sponsored athletes and has also been caught trying to solicit those same athletes
3 through social media.

4 61. Defendants' communications to one another startlingly reveal the fact that
5 they knew all along that what they were doing was illegal, and feared that Nike might
6 discover their unlawful scheme. For example, Miner told Dekovic and Dolce that he
7 "Wish[ed] [they] both were using personal phones" and suggested that "we should just
8 communicate on whats[ap]p" (an iPhone application used to send private messages). The
9 three frequently cautioned one another with warnings such as to "stay off text" and to be
10 "very careful ...[n]ot to raise suspicions" at Nike with their behavior. And they conducted
11 email communications over their personal yahoo accounts so as to avoid detection by Nike.
12 They nonetheless accessed all of this media over the Nike owned and provided laptops or
13 phones (or copied it onto these Nike owned devices), granting Nike the right to read their
14 communications, including the attachments.

15 **Defendants Misappropriate, Misuse, and Retain Nike's Confidential Information**

16 62. In making the final sale of their plan for the Brooklyn Creative Design Studio
17 to Adidas, the conspirators promised Adidas that "we also bring a wealth of information and
18 knowledge that will give Adi[das] the advantage," which Defendants knew Adidas could use
19 to "hurt [its] competitor" Nike.

20 63. These were not idle promises. The conspirators took overt acts to ensure that
21 they could deliver the competitively valuable information as promised. Dolce and Miner
22 told Dekovic that he could "always remove [his laptop] H[ard] D[rive]" and then send the
23 laptop "back to Nike." But Defendants concluded that might be too suspicious and so
24 Dekovic told Dolce and Miner instead that he could "get all the files" from his laptop and
25 then "send [it] back" to Nike. And that is exactly what he did. Less than two weeks before
26 leaving Nike, Dekovic had the entire contents of his Nike-issued laptop copied onto a

1 bootable recovery disk, complete with thousands of proprietary documents including Nike's
2 global football footwear product designs and business and marketing plans for the next three
3 to five years.

4 64. Dekovic then returned his laptop to Nike, telling Nike that the laptop had been
5 accidentally damaged. Dekovic, however, neglected to inform Nike that he had nonetheless
6 had the contents of his laptop copied onto a disk and failed to return that copy to Nike.
7 Instead, he left Nike with the impression that the computer had been broken and unused since
8 early September.

9 65. Just three days before leaving Nike, Dolce emailed to his personal email
10 account a computer .zip file containing highly confidential documents, including design
11 drawings related to an as-yet unreleased shoe designed for one of Nike's endorsed athletes.

12 66. The Confidential Information stolen from Dekovic's and Dolce's laptops
13 includes:

- 14 a. **Nike's Future Strategic Development Plans, Product Offerings, and**
15 **Product Launches.** Extremely confidential and commercially sensitive
16 master strategic business plans that reflect Nike's global football business
17 strategies for the next three-to-four years, including specific strategies for
18 competing directly against Adidas through 2016, many of Nike's key planned
19 global football product launches (including footwear, uniforms and
20 equipment), and where and how Nike has chosen to focus its resources;
- 21 b. **Nike's Unreleased Product Design Materials.** Drawings, models,
22 renderings, sketches, material designs, and design schematics for Nike global
23 football footwear and apparel and other athletic footwear products set to be
24 released over the next two-to-three years, including models of team uniforms
25 (kits) for the 2016 European Championships, and other footwear, uniforms,
26

- 1 and accessories, reflecting details of each product's design, including
2 materials, fabrics, cuts, and color strategies;
- 3 c. **Nike's Unreleased Product Technology.** Documents reflecting proprietary
4 and highly confidential innovations in Nike's athletic apparel and footwear
5 technology that have yet to be made public, including computer assisted
6 design (CAD) drawings, and technical packs for as yet-unreleased global
7 football footwear, material, and equipment innovations.
- 8 d. **Nike's Financial Product Performance Information.** Documents reflecting
9 a non-public financial breakdown of footwear sales at the product level,
10 including past performance data, gross margin expectations, and projected
11 growth for the next 12 to 18 months;
- 12 e. **Nike's Marketing Campaign Materials.** Documents containing complete
13 descriptions of Nike's footwear product marketing strategies, including
14 promotion, in-store presentations, training, and public relations relating to
15 specific past and future product launches and events, including story lines
16 around new product launches, and plans for Nike-sponsored athletes and
17 teams such the French, English, Dutch, Korean, United States and Brazilian
18 national teams, as well as top club teams FC Barcelona, Manchester City,
19 Paris St. Germain, Inter Milan and AS Roma;
- 20 f. **Nike's Virtual Testing Methodologies.** Documents describing Nike's highly
21 confidential and proprietary virtual footwear product design and computer
22 simulation testing methodology and other product development and testing
23 plans; and
- 24 g. **Nike's Blueprints for Product Launches.** Documents reflecting all aspects
25 of specific Nike product launches, amounting to a veritable step-by-step
26 instruction manual for conducting a successful product launch.

1 67. Defendants have not returned to Nike these wrongfully obtained copies of
2 Nike’s Confidential Information. And, in the course of discussing their deals with Adidas,
3 Defendants have unequivocally expressed their willingness to deliver up Nike’s confidential
4 information for Adidas’ competitive advantage, and no doubt intend to use Nike’s
5 Confidential Information to benefit themselves and Adidas in connection with the Brooklyn
6 Creative Design Studio.

7 **Defendants Erase and Destroy Evidence and Resign From Nike**

8 68. In the days before they left Nike, Defendants tried to cover their tracks by
9 erasing incriminating emails and text messages from their Nike-issued iPhones and laptops.
10 Defendants were well aware of the fact that “[a]ll [of their] work computers, [and] work cell
11 phones” would be full of months’ worth of “information that [Nike] can acquire” relating to
12 their illegal scheme to compete with Nike. Defendants thus decided to take no chances and
13 attempted to destroy all of the incriminating evidence on their Nike-issued work devices.

14 69. Just before leaving Nike, Defendants ordered new personal mobile devices
15 and moved their cellular accounts from Nike to their personal responsibility in an effort to
16 hide the evidence of their scheming. Dolce and Miner then reset their Nike phones in an
17 attempt to make their text messages and emails inaccessible to Nike once the phones were
18 returned to Nike inventory. Dolce also deleted most of his laptop computer files, including
19 emails reflecting Defendants’ scheme, and documents and other data belonging to Nike.
20 Miner similarly took steps to erase incriminating emails and other data from his laptop.
21 Dekovic did not erase his laptop and phone, wrongfully believing that both items had been
22 damaged so badly that Nike could not access their contents.

23 70. Defendants then resigned from Nike and turned in devices that they believed
24 to have been expunged or clear of evidence of their betrayals.

25

26

1 **Defendants Help Adidas Leverage Their New Allegiance to Attract Other Designers**

2 71. During their negotiations with Adidas, Defendants had concluded that Adidas
3 “need[ed] us bad and for us to influence other people to come” and determined that they
4 could use that fact to their advantage. Thus, despite knowing full well and discussing
5 amongst themselves the fact that “It is illegal for us to silicate [sic] nike employees to go
6 w[ith] us to Adidas now as employees and during the next year,” (even indirectly)
7 Defendants did just that.


8 72. In exchange for agreeing to “influence other people to come” Defendants
9 extracted more money from Adidas during their contractual negotiation. As they put it “the
10 price goes up” if Defendants agreed to help solicit and attract other Nike employees on
11 Adidas’ behalf. And they did, agreeing to tell Adidas that “We will bring more talented
12 designers to Adidas” with them and then targeting several Nike employees, including Nike
13 designers.

14 73. In addition to targeting Nike designers on Adidas’ behalf, Defendants also
15 settled on the idea of highly publicizing their departure from Nike as a means of indirectly
16 “influenc[ing] other” designers away from Nike to join the new Adidas-led business. In the
17 weeks before they resigned, Defendants discussed whether they should announce at the time
18 they left Nike that they were going to work for Adidas. Defendants believed that “If we say
19 [we are going to] Adi, they can use our names to recruit.” Defendants thus decided to
20 announce their departure and association with Adidas, to enable “Adidas [to] leverage [the
21 announcement] to get other talented designers to want to follow our lead.” They expressed
22 confidence that Adidas would “clear space” for them by removing existing Adidas
23 employees (e.g., “like James”) who could get in their way. Given this probability, they
24 concluded that they would need to be careful of making other Adidas employees “paranoid
25 [that] a lot of people [] will lose [their] jobs.”

26

1 74. Undeterred by the clear one-year non-solicitation restrictions in their
2 contracts, Defendants determined it was important to provide Adidas with *immediate*
3 leverage to recruit other designers. As they discussed amongst themselves, recruitment
4 efforts would take too long if they observed the one-year period in their agreements.
5 Dekovic told Dolce and Miner that: “If we get there in 1yr [and] then start to tell other
6 designers to come that would be another year until they arrive because of there [sic] non
7 competes.”

8 75. Immediately upon quitting Nike, therefore, Defendants plastered their social
9 media accounts, including Instagram and Twitter, with messages for their followers that
10 Defendants were “excited” to become part of “three stripes” and “Team Adidas 2015” and
11 repeatedly displaying “///”—a well-known Adidas logo and trademark:

12
13  A screenshot of a Twitter post from the user @ParisDekovic, dated Sep 27. The text of the tweet reads: "GRATEFUL for the past", followed by three slashes "///", "EXCITED for the future", followed by three slashes "///", "3 brothers", followed by three slashes "///", "3 dreamers", followed by three slashes "///", "3 stripes", followed by three slashes "///", and "#TeamAdidas 2015".
14 GRATEFUL for the past
15 ///
16 EXCITED for the future
17 ///
18 3 brothers
19 ///
20 3 dreamers
21 ///
22 3 stripes
23 ///
24 #TeamAdidas 2015



1 76. Defendants did so despite knowing full well that their noncompete agreements
2 with Nike prohibited them from “being connected in any manner with....Adidas” for a full-
3 one-year period after leaving Nike’s employment. Defendants have continued to breach their
4 noncompete obligations by advertising their connections with Adidas through the press and
5 social media even today.

6 77. Even while publicly promoting and associating with the Adidas brand in the
7 days after they quit, each Defendant privately assured Nike that he would abide by the terms
8 of his Noncompete Agreement and that he had returned all confidential, proprietary, and
9 trade secret Nike information—knowing full well that they had not. Dekovic even went so
10 far as to tell Nike employees that he had loved working at Nike, had tremendous respect for
11 the company and the brand, and that he only planned to spend a few years’ time at Adidas
12 and hoped to eventually come back to Nike to work as a design consultant.

13 78. Adidas also made use of Defendants’ departure, stating that it anticipated that
14 Defendants and their Brooklyn Creative Design Studio would “[d]rive design direction for
15 the brand and elevate the company’s direct interaction with consumers.”

16 79. Adidas announced that it had created a “new” and “innovative” design
17 approach with Defendants, rather than calling the new Creative Design Studio what it truly
18 was: an artful repackaging of Nike’s design approach. In statements attributed to him at the
19 time, Adidas’ Global Creative Director Paul Gaudio, who had been meeting with Defendants
20 regarding the details of the studio throughout their recruitment by Adidas, remarked that:
21 “The Brooklyn Creative Studio will be a small but essential operation aimed at exploring
22 design direction for the brand. This facility will be an open source creative center allowing
23 us to connect and collaborate with consumers in a way we’ve never done before.”

24
25
26

1 **Defendant Dekovic's Theft of Nike's Inventions and Designs**

2 80. Meanwhile, Dekovic had been working on yet another side footwear and
3 sportswear business conceived while he was employed at Nike, and which he had kept
4 hidden not only from Nike, but apparently also from his co-conspirators and Adidas.

5 81. All the while he was negotiating with Adidas, and during the time of his
6 employment at Nike, Dekovic had been drawing up plans for a "Moonwalker" shoe and
7 sportswear design, which he had based in part on the design of existing vintage Nike
8 footwear and simply rebranded as a Michael Jackson inspired product line. The moniker for
9 the business derived from the dance move known as the "moon walk" that Jackson had
10 popularized in the 1980s. But the name was the only original aspect of the business:
11 PowerPoint presentations containing drawings for three shoes in the proposed product line
12 reveal that two of the designs are essentially copies of vintage Nike footwear.

13 82. Dekovic then methodically secured outside investors in the business by
14 promising lucrative returns on Moonwalker product sales. In emails to investors while still a
15 Nike employee, Dekovic and his business advisors described his vision for positioning
16 Moonwalker as a "leading sportswear brand," that would compete with Nike's product
17 offerings and included detailed plans for product launches in 2015 to 2017. Dekovic has
18 projected Moonwalker's gross profits to be \$93 million in the first six years of business,
19 which he stands to reap at Nike's expense.

20 83. Dekovic knew full well what he was doing was a blatant violation of his
21 noncompete, confidentiality, and assignment agreements with Nike. He repeatedly told
22 prospective investors and business advisors of the need for "confidentiality" surrounding the
23 business, begging them to keep the project "very confidential" because he "could be in hot
24 waters for doing this."

25 84. Dekovic continues to prepare for the launch of the Moonwalker line of
26 products, which rightly belong to Nike, in early 2015. He has prepared cash flow

1 spreadsheets, projected profit statements, identified and lined up retailers to carry the
2 products, and developed the details of numerous different types of footwear and athletic
3 wear, with their retail costs, unit costs, and projected quantities. Dekovic intends for the
4 products to be marketed and sold to the same customer base to which Nike markets and sells
5 its footwear products.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Breach of Contract - All Defendants)

8 85. Nike realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in
9 paragraphs 1 through 84.

10 86. Defendant Dekovic signed a Noncompete Agreement with Nike at the time
11 and as a condition of his promotion to Design Director on February 7, 2012, which was a
12 bona fide advancement within Nike. Dekovic also signed an Employee Invention and
13 Secrecy Agreement (“Secrecy Agreement”) on April 16, 2007, as a condition of his
14 employment. The Noncompete and Secrecy Agreements were fully enforceable at the time
15 of execution and remain so today.

16 87. At the time of and as a condition of his employment, Defendant Dolce signed
17 a Noncompete Agreement and a Secrecy Agreement on October 3, 2005, which were fully
18 enforceable at the time of execution and remain so today.

19 88. Defendant Miner signed a Noncompete Agreement at the time and as a
20 condition of his promotion to Senior Designer on January 30, 2011, which was a bona fide
21 advancement within Nike. As a condition of his employment, Miner signed a Secrecy
22 Agreement on October 3, 2008. The Noncompete and Secrecy Agreements were fully
23 enforceable at the time of execution and remain so today.

24 89. Section 1(a) of the each of the Designers’ Noncompete Agreements includes a
25 noncompete clause, under which each employee agreed as follows:

26

1 **During EMPLOYEE’S employment** by NIKE, under the terms of
2 any employment contract or otherwise, **and for 1 year thereafter**, (the
3 “Restriction Period”), **EMPLOYEE will not** directly or indirectly,
4 own, manage, control, or participate in the ownership, management or
5 control of, or be employed by, **consult for, or be connected in any**
6 **manner with, any business engaged anywhere in the world in the**
7 **athletic footwear, athletic apparel or sports equipment and**
8 **accessories business**, or any other business which directly competes
9 with NIKE or any of its parent, subsidiaries, or affiliated corporations
10 (a “Competitor”)...**including but not limited to: Adidas**. (emphasis
11 added)

12 90. The Noncompete Agreements require Nike to compensate Defendants 50
13 percent of their salaries for the period of time that Nike elects to enforce the noncompetition
14 restriction following employment. *Id.*, Section 1(d). However, the Agreements exclude any
15 time during which Defendants are in breach of the noncompetition obligation from the one-
16 year restriction period. *Id.* Although Nike is relieved of its compensation obligations in the
17 event that Defendants breach their obligations, Nike is still paying the 50 percent portion of
18 Defendants’ salaries. *Id.*, Section 1(b).

19 91. Defendants have breached Section 1(a) of their Noncompete Agreements by
20 consulting with, and publicly associating themselves with, Nike’s competitor Adidas during
21 and within one-year of the period of their employment with Nike.

22 92. Dekovic has further breached Section 1(a) of his Noncompete Agreement by
23 managing, controlling, and participating in the ownership of the “Moonwalker” shoe and
24 sportswear business, which is in the athletic footwear business and competes with Nike.

25 93. Under Section 6 of the Noncompete Agreements Defendants agreed that:

26 **During the term of this Agreement and for a period of one (1) year**
27 **thereafter, EMPLOYEE will not** directly or indirectly, **solicit**, divert
28 or hire away (or attempt to solicit, divert or hire away) to or for
29 himself or any other company or business organization, **any NIKE**
30 **employee**, whether or not such employee is a full-time employee or
31 temporary employee and whether or not such employment is pursuant
32 to a written agreement or is at will or any independent contractor
33 working for Nike. (emphasis added)

1 94. Defendants have breached Section 6 of their Noncompete Agreements by
2 recruiting each other to leave Nike and join Adidas.

3 95. Defendants have further breached Section 6 of their Noncompete Agreements
4 by attempting to recruit and divert other designers employed by Nike, both through direct
5 communications, and indirectly, through public announcements of their association with
6 Adidas.

7 96. Section 3 of the Noncompete Agreements obligates Defendants to not disclose
8 any "Protected Information," including Nike's Confidential Information defined above and
9 any other sensitive, confidential, proprietary, and Trade Secret commercial information, to
10 Nike's competitors or any other any third-parties. Section 3(a) defines "Protected
11 Information" as:

12 "Protected Information" shall mean **all proprietary information**, in
13 whatever form and format, of NIKE and all information provided to
14 NIKE by third parties which NIKE is obligated to keep confidential.
15 **EMPLOYEE agrees that any and all information to which**
16 **EMPLOYEE has access concerning NIKE projects and internal**
17 **NIKE information is Protected Information**, whether in verbal
18 form, machine-readable form, written or other tangible form, and
19 whether designated as confidential or unmarked. Without limiting the
20 foregoing, Protected Information includes trade secrets and
21 competitively sensitive business or professional information
(regardless of whether such information constitutes a trade secret)
relating to NIKE's research and development activities, its intellectual
property and the filing or pendency of patent applications, confidential
techniques, methods, styles, designs, design concepts and ideas,
customer and vendor lists, contract factory lists, pricing information,
manufacturing plans, business and marketing plans or strategy, product
development plans, product launch plans, financial information, sales
information, methods of operation, manufacturing processes and
methods, products, and personnel information. (emphasis added)

22 97. Pursuant to Section 3(c), Defendants agreed to safeguard Nike's Protected
23 Information by agreeing as follows:

24 **During the period of employment by NIKE and for a period of two**
25 **(2) years thereafter, EMPLOYEE will hold in confidence and**
26 **protect all Protected Information and will not, at any time,**
directly or indirectly, use any Protected Information for any
purpose outside the scope of EMPLOYEE's employment with

1 **NIKE or disclose any Protected Information to any third person or**
2 **organization without the prior written consent of NIKE. Specifically,**
3 **but not by way of limitation, EMPLOYEE WILL NOT EVER copy,**
4 **transmit, reproduce, summarize, quote, publish or make any**
5 **commercial or other use whatsoever of any Protected Information**
6 **without the prior written consent of NIKE. EMPLOYEE will also take**
7 **reasonable security precautions and such other actions as may be**
8 **necessary to insure that there is no use or disclosure, intentional or**
9 **inadvertent, of Protected Information in violation of this Agreement.**
10 **(emphasis added)**

11 98. In addition, under Section 1 of the Secrecy Agreements, the designers each
12 agreed during and after his employment not to use or disclose Nike’s confidential
13 information, which is defined to include “trade secrets, processes, products,
14 machines....drawings...blueprints, notes, records...sketches, plans, photographs...designs,
15 design concepts, business plans and marketing and sales information.”

16 99. Defendants have breached Section 1 of their Secrecy Agreements and Section
17 3(c) of their Noncompete Agreements by misappropriating Nike’s Protected Information.
18 This includes, but is not limited to Dekovic’s copying of the contents of his laptop hard drive
19 and Dolce’s emailing of confidential product information to his personal email account.

20 100. Defendants also intend to use and disclose Nike’s Protected Information and
21 Confidential Information as defined above and in the Noncompete and Secrecy Agreements
22 to benefit Adidas in the future, in further breach of the Agreements.

23 101. Under Section 4 of the Noncompete Agreements, Defendants further agreed to
24 return all Protected Information at the termination of their employment with Nike, including
25 all forms of such information and any copies. Defendants further agreed under Section 4 that
26 upon the conclusion of their employment, they would “deliver promptly to NIKE all
27 confidential information of NIKE (including copies, reproductions, and translations thereof)
28 which I have in my possession, custody, or control.”

1 102. Dekovic has separately breached Section 4 of his Noncompete Agreement by
2 failing to return to Nike the copy of his laptop hard drive that he caused to be made on
3 September 16, 2014 in Italy, six days before he resigned his employment at Nike.

4 103. Dolce has separately breached Section 4 of his Noncompete Agreement by
5 failing to return to Nike the confidential design plans he emailed to his personal email
6 account on September 19, 2014, three days before he resigned his employment at Nike.

7 104. Under Section 8 of his Secrecy Agreement, Dekovic agreed to “disclose
8 promptly and in writing to Nike all inventions including improvements which are conceived
9 or made by me during the term of my employment with Nike whether or not such inventions
10 are assignable under this Agreement.” Under Section 4 of the Secrecy Agreement, Dekovic
11 further agreed “I hereby assign and agree to assign to Nike all rights, title and interest in and
12 to inventions, including improvements, which are conceived or made by me during my
13 employment term with Nike which relate in any way to the ... business...or products of
14 Nike.”

15 105. The designs of the Moonwalker shoes and sportswear are qualifying
16 inventions under Dekovic’s Secrecy Agreement.

17 106. Dekovic’s failure to disclose the concept and designs of the Moonwalker
18 shoes and sportswear to Nike and his failure to assign the rights and interest in those concepts
19 and designs to Nike are breaches of the Secrecy Agreement.

20 107. Nike has performed all aspects of the Noncompete Agreements with respect to
21 Dekovic, Dolce, and Miner, including paying each of them 50 percent of their Nike salaries
22 during the applicable noncompete period.

23 108. Nike has performed all aspects of the Secrecy Agreements with respect to
24 Dekovic, Dolce, and Miner.

25 109. Nike has suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm as a result of
26 Defendants’ breach of their Noncompete Agreements and Secrecy Agreements.

1 110. Nike is entitled to temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief
2 restraining and enjoining Dekovic, Dolce, and Miner, and all persons acting in concert with
3 them, from directly or indirectly competing against Nike in violation of the Noncompete and
4 Secrecy Agreements, including being employed by or connected with Adidas or working,
5 collaborating, or having any contact whatsoever with Adidas or any competitor of Nike
6 during the one-year period, as extended in accordance with Section 1(b) described below.

7 111. Nike is entitled to injunctive relief extending Defendants' noncompete period
8 to a term of at least 18 months. Pursuant to Section 1(b) of the Designer Noncompete
9 Agreements, Nike is entitled to extend the restrictive period for the time period during which
10 the designers have been in breach of their agreements. Nike estimates that the period of time
11 they were in breach prior to quitting was six months, making the total period for which they
12 should be enjoined at least 18 months, as well as any additional time they remain in breach as
13 shall be proven at trial.

14 112. Pursuant to Section 1(b) of the Designer Noncompete Agreements, the
15 Defendants' breach of those agreements relieves Nike of its obligation to pay Defendants
16 consideration under the agreements. Defendants' breach of those agreements further entitles
17 Nike to reimbursement of the payments already made to Defendants under the Designer
18 Noncompete Agreements during the period of time they remain in breach.

19 113. Nike has suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm as a result of
20 Defendants' breaches of the Designer Noncompete and Secrecy Agreements. Nike is entitled
21 to temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief restraining and Defendants, and
22 all persons acting in concert with them, from directly or indirectly soliciting or attempting to
23 solicit any Nike employee during the one-year period, as extended in accordance with
24 Section 1(b) of the Designer Noncompete Agreements, as described in paragraph 30 above.

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1 114. The use and disclosure and threatened use and disclosure of Nike's
2 confidential and Protected Information to Adidas or any other competitor has and will cause
3 Nike irreparable harm.

4 115. Nike is entitled to temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief
5 restraining and enjoining Defendants, and all persons acting in concert with them, from
6 directly or indirectly using or disclosing its Protected Information and compelling Dekovic to
7 return the copy of his laptop and any other documents he has retained in violation of his
8 contract, and compelling Dolce to return any copies of the documents he improperly retained
9 in violation of his contract.

10 116. Nike is entitled to a declaratory judgment that Dekovic has assigned all rights
11 to the Moonwalker designs, concepts, shoes and all other intellectual property related to
12 Moonwalker to Nike, and that Nike therefore owns the Moonwalker shoes and sportswear
13 intellectual property and all business plans, designs, or documents related to the Moonwalker
14 shoes and sportswear.

15 117. In addition, as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breaches of their
16 Noncompete and Secrecy Agreements, Nike has suffered damages in an amount to be proven
17 at trial.

18 SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

19 (Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing - All Defendants)

20 118. Nike realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in
21 paragraphs 1 through 117.

22 119. At all relevant times alleged herein, Defendants and Nike were parties to the
23 Designer Noncompete and Secrecy Agreements. Each and every one of the Designer
24 Noncompete and Secrecy Agreements contains an implied covenant of good faith, and fair
25 dealing.

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1 120. Defendants have breached their duty of good faith and fair dealing in
2 numerous ways, including, but not limited to, by consulting and conspiring to compete
3 against Nike with a competitor while employed by Nike, by consulting with and for Adidas,
4 by soliciting one another to compete with Nike and join Adidas, and by misappropriating,
5 retaining, and failing to return Nike’s Protected Information.

6 121. In addition, Dekovic breached his duty of good faith and fair dealing by
7 actively working on a line of Moonwalker footwear and sportswear products that is
8 competitive with Nike while employed by Nike.

9 122. Dekovic further breached his duty of good faith and fair dealing by inducing
10 Nike to pay for his relocation to Italy in June 2014 under the pretenses that he planned to
11 continue to be a Nike employee, when, in reality, he was in discussions to leave for Adidas.

12 123. Nike has suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm as a result of
13 Defendants’ breaches. Nike is entitled to temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive
14 relief restraining and enjoining Defendants and all persons acting in concert with him from
15 competing against Nike, soliciting Nike employees, and retaining or using Nike’s Protected
16 Information in violation of the Designer Agreements, and requiring Defendants to return all
17 of Nike’s Protected Information they have in their possession. Nike is entitled to temporary,
18 preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief requiring Dekovic to assign to Nike his rights
19 and interest in the Moonwalker shoes and sportswear.

20 124. In addition, as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ breaches of their
21 duty to act in good faith, Nike has suffered damages in an amount to be proved at trial.

22 **THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

23 **(Breach of Duty of Loyalty - All Defendants)**

24 125. Nike realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in
25 paragraphs 1 through 124.

26

1 126. Defendants owed Nike duties of loyalty while employees of Nike, requiring
2 that they act at all times in Nike's interest and not take actions materially detrimental to Nike.

3 127. Defendants breached their duties of loyalty to Nike while they were still Nike
4 employees by acting for their own benefit rather than Nike's, by among other things, actively
5 conspiring with each other and by consulting with Adidas to form the "Brooklyn Creative
6 Design Studio" and compete against Nike, by wrongfully retaining, using, or disclosing
7 Nike's proprietary and confidential information in doing so, and by soliciting other Nike
8 designers to leave Nike and join Adidas.

9 128. In addition, Dekovic breached his duty of loyalty by planning to develop,
10 design, market and sell the Moonwalker shoes and sportswear independently and without
11 giving Nike the opportunity to do so, and by misappropriating Nike's confidential and trade
12 secret Protected Information in developing and designing the Moonwalker products.

13 129. Dekovic further breached his duty of loyalty by inducing Nike to pay for his
14 relocation to Italy in June 2014 under the pretenses that he planned to continue to be a Nike
15 employee, when, in reality, he was in discussions to leave for Adidas.

16 130. Nike has suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm as a result of
17 Defendants' breach of duties of loyalty owed to Nike. Nike is entitled to temporary,
18 preliminary and permanent injunctive relief restraining and enjoining Defendants and all
19 persons acting in concert with them from misappropriating and using Nike's confidential
20 protected information to Nike's detriment.

21 131. In addition, as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach of duties of
22 loyalty owed to Nike, Nike has suffered damages in an amount to be proved at trial,
23 including lost current and future profits or other damages resulting from Defendants'
24 breaches or derived in any way from the use of any of Nike's confidential protected
25 information.

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FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Misappropriation of Trade Secrets - All Defendants)

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3 132. Nike realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in
4 paragraphs 1 through 131.

5 133. Nike’s Confidential and Protected Information includes information related to
6 current and future product designs; business plans; market analyses; product development,
7 testing, and manufacturing techniques and strategies; and marketing plans for developing and
8 marketing Nike’s current and future sportswear products.

9 134. Nike’s Confidential and Protected Information constitutes “trade secrets”
10 under ORS 646.461(4) because that information derives independent economic value from
11 not being generally known to the public or to persons who can obtain economic value from
12 its disclosure or use, and is subject to reasonable efforts under the circumstances by Nike to
13 maintain its secrecy.

14 135. During the course of the employment relationship between Nike and
15 Defendants, Defendants were given access to Nike’s trade secrets, and Defendants were
16 under a duty to keep such information confidential, to refrain from using that information to
17 Nike’s detriment, and were required to return all such information to Nike upon termination
18 of employment.

19 136. Defendants have misappropriated Nike’s confidential trade secrets by
20 obtaining that information by improper means, including by copying the materials from their
21 Nike issued laptops onto personal devices or email accounts, which they retained after
22 resigning from Nike, and by disclosing and using this information to compete against Nike
23 and to plan and implement the “Brooklyn Creative Design Studio.”

24 137. Defendants have failed to return to Nike any of the misappropriated
25 Confidential Information and trade secrets.

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1 138. Nike has suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm due to
2 Defendants' misappropriation of Nike's trade secrets. Nike is entitled to temporary,
3 preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief restraining and enjoining Defendants and all
4 persons acting in concert with them from using Nike's trade secrets, and requiring
5 Defendants or anyone else given such information to return it to Nike.

6 139. In addition, as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' misappropriation
7 of Nike's trade secrets, Nike has suffered damages in an amount to be proved at trial. On
8 information and belief, Defendants' misappropriation was willful and malicious and Nike is
9 entitled to punitive damages of twice the amount of actual damages suffered. Nike is also
10 entitled to recover its attorneys' fees.

11 **FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

12 **(Tortious Interference with Current and Prospective Contractual and Economic**
13 **Relations - All Defendants)**

14 140. Nike realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in
15 paragraphs 1 through 139.

16 141. Nike has a legally protectable interest in preventing interference with its
17 current and prospective contractual relationships with its employees, from which Nike
18 derives significant economic benefit. Defendants were and are aware of Nike's contractual
19 and economic relationships.

20 142. Defendants intentionally, and with an improper purpose and by improper
21 means, interfered with Nike's current and prospective contractual relationships with its
22 designer employees, including by publicly announcing their association with Adidas to help
23 recruit other Nike designers, and by soliciting and targeting other Nike designers to leave
24 Nike and come work for Adidas in violation of Defendants' non-solicitation agreements and
25 duties of loyalty to Nike.

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1 143. Each Defendant further intentionally, and with an improper purpose and by
2 improper means, interfered with Nike's contractual and prospective economic relationships
3 with each of the other Defendants, including Nike's Noncompete, Nondisclosure, and
4 Secrecy Agreements with each of the other Defendants, by inducing and conspiring with the
5 other Defendants to leave Nike and join Adidas, misappropriating and misusing Nike's
6 Protected Information in the process, in violation of their Noncompete, Secrecy and non-
7 solicitation agreements and duties of loyalty to Nike.

8 144. Nike has suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm as a result of
9 Defendants' intentional interference with Nike's contractual and prospective economic
10 relationships. Nike is entitled to temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief
11 restraining and enjoining Defendants, and all those acting in concert with them, from
12 interfering with Nike's contractual and prospective economic relationships. Nike is further
13 entitled to temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief restraining and enjoining
14 Defendants and all persons acting in concert with them from directly or indirectly competing
15 against Nike in violation of the Designer Agreements, and from using Nike's Protected
16 Information to do so.

17 145. In addition, as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' intentional
18 interference, Nike has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

19 **SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

20 **(Fraud in the Inducement - Against Dekovic)**

21 146. Nike realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in
22 paragraphs 1 through 145.

23 147. In order to induce Nike to pay for his relocation to Italy in July 2014 to
24 accommodate personal requirements related to his immigration status, Dekovic expressly and
25 impliedly falsely represented to Nike that he would continue to remain employed at Nike and
26

1 intentionally did not disclose that he , at that time, intended to leave Nike to work for
2 Adidas.

3 148. Dekovic's conduct was outrageous. He specifically targeted Italy based on his
4 belief that Nike's noncompete would be difficult to enforce in Italy. At the time Dekovic
5 made these intentional misrepresentations and omissions, he in fact did not intend to remain
6 employed at Nike. By July 2014, when he and his family received their all-expenses-paid
7 move to Italy (where Dekovic's wife is from), Dekovic had already travelled to Nuremburg,
8 Germany to meet with representatives from Adidas. Dekovic knew that if he revealed his
9 plans to leave Nike for Adidas, Nike would not pay for his relocation to Italy.

10 149. Nike reasonably relied on Dekovic's representations and intentional
11 omissions, and to its detriment, paid all the costs associated with relocating Dekovic and his
12 family to Italy in an amount estimated to be approximately \$50,000. Nike would not have
13 paid the relocation costs but for Dekovic's misrepresentations.

14 150. As a consequence of Nike's reliance on Dekovic's representations and
15 intentional omissions as set forth above, Nike has been damaged in an amount to be proven
16 at trial, plus interest, but which is currently estimated to at least be \$50,000.

17 SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

18 (Conversion / Writ of Replevin - Against Dekovic and Dolce)

19 151. Nike realleges and incorporates herein the factual allegations set out in
20 paragraphs 1 through 150.

21 152. The Nike Protected Information on the external drive containing the copy of
22 Dekovic's Nike laptop is an intangible chattel belonging solely and exclusively to Nike.

23 153. By keeping and refusing to return Nike's Protected Information following the
24 termination of his employment, Dekovic has intentionally exercised dominion and control
25 over Nike's property.

26

1 154. Dekovic’s interference with Nike’s rights to control its Protected Information
2 is serious enough that he may justly be required to pay Nike the full value of the Protected
3 Information.

4 155. As a direct and proximate result of Dekovic’s conversion of its Protected
5 Information, Nike has suffered damages, which at this time are simply incalculable.

6 156. Nike is entitled to temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief—
7 and/or in the alternative a writ of replevin—restraining and enjoining Dekovic, and all those
8 acting in concert with him, from possessing or using Nike’s Protected Information, and
9 requiring that he immediately return all Nike Protected Information in his possession or
10 control.

11 157. The Nike Protected Information in the personal email account of Dolce is an
12 intangible chattel belonging solely and exclusively to Nike.

13 158. By keeping and refusing to return Nike’s Protected Information following the
14 termination of his employment, Dolce has intentionally exercised dominion and control over
15 Nike’s property.

16 159. Dolce’s interference with Nike’s rights to control its Protected Information is
17 serious enough that he may justly be required to pay Nike the full value of the Protected
18 Information.

19 160. As a direct and proximate result of Dolce’s conversion of its Protected
20 Information, Nike has suffered damages, which at this time are simply incalculable.

21 161. Nike is entitled to temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief—
22 and/or in the alternative a writ of replevin—restraining and enjoining Dolce, and all those
23 acting in concert with him, from possessing or using Nike’s Protected Information, and
24 requiring that he immediately return all Nike Protected Information in his possession or
25 control.

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EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Civil Conspiracy – All Defendants)

162. Nike realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 161.

163. Through their conduct described above Defendants acted in concert and pursuant to the common design and scheme to pursue an unlawful object or course of action to be accomplished by unlawful means, with the primary and common purpose of competing against Nike, to the detriment of Nike.

164. Defendants committed one or more unlawful acts in furtherance of the civil conspiracy, including, but not limited to, breach of contract, interference with contract and economic relations, misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential information, and breaching (or aiding and assisting in breaching) of contractual and fiduciary duties.

165. As a direct and proximate result of these unlawful acts, Nike has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

166. Because Defendants acted in concert with each other to accomplish these unlawful acts as set forth above, each Defendant is jointly and severally liable to Nike for all damages resulting from any and all acts committed in furtherance of their civil conspiracy.

Punitive Damages

167. Nike intends to move pursuant to ORS 31.725 to add a claim for punitive damages against each Defendant for their willful breaches of their duty of loyalty to Nike (Count III), their intentional interference with Nike’s contracts and prospective economic relationships (Count V), and Dekovic’s fraud in the inducement (Count VII).

WHEREFORE, Nike prays for relief as follows:

- 1. An order temporarily, preliminarily, and permanently enjoining Defendants from:

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- a. using or benefiting, directly or indirectly, from the use of Nike’s Confidential Information;
 - b. publicly associating or connecting themselves with Adidas for a one-year period, including on the internet, on any social media accounts, or in the traditional press;
 - c. pursuing any other footwear design opportunities whether independently or in conjunction with Adidas or any other Nike competitor for a reasonable period of time;
 - d. from negotiating with any investors, selling any products, or otherwise launching any business venture relating to the Moonwalker shoe and sportswear designs;
2. An order requiring Defendants to:
- a. destroy and to certify under oath the destruction of all materials derived in any way, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, from Nike’s Confidential Information, including the strategic blueprint for the Brooklyn Creative Design Studio and any related materials;
 - b. return to Nike any Nike Confidential Information in their possession, custody, or control and to disclose all persons and/or entities to whom Defendants disclosed such information;
 - c. to produce their personal devices and passwords for forensic examination, at Nike’s expense, by an independent forensic examiner;
 - d. to disgorge all unjust enrichment as a result of their taking and use of Nike’s Confidential Information;
3. An order imposing a constructive trust on, and requiring a detailed accounting of, all revenues derived from the use of Nike’s Confidential Information;


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- 4. A declaratory judgment that any Moonwalker-related designs, business plans, or other information were assigned to Nike under Dekovic’s Secrecy Agreement and an order requiring Dekovic to provide Nike with all such documents or information;
- 5. A declaratory judgment that Defendants breached their noncompete obligations to Nike under the Noncompete Agreements from April 2014 to the present, and that:
 - a. The Restrictive Period in those agreements is therefore extended for a period of time from April 2014 through the date of the Court’s Order;
 - b. Nike is not obligated to continue to pay severance under the Designer Noncompete Agreements and defendants are required to pay Nike back for compensation received under those agreements to-date;

- 1 6. An award of economic damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
- 2 7. An award of costs and attorneys' fees; and
- 3 8. All other relief the Court deems fit and proper.

4 DATED: December 8, 2014.

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